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Foreword
n this issue of POLICY STUDIES we continue the topic of
our previous issue, w7here the economic strategy of
Ukraine has been discussed. The authors argued that
Ukraine could not return back to the virtual stability and
prosperity of the Soviet Union.
However, a lot of Ukrainian people think of return. Stable
prices, guaranteed jobs and wage and beneficial social
network remain in the memories of thousands regarding
developed socialism during the 70-80s. But stability of the
system and levels of welfare are a question mark.
Answers to these questions we found in the works of Yehor
Haydar, a well-known Russian economist, who, being a
Prime-Minister of Russia for two years, headed the country
toward the market. In this issue of POLICY STUDIES we
present chapters 3-5 of his book Anomalies of Economic
Growth, which was published in 1997, but has been almost
unknown in Ukraine.
We extend our thanks to Mr. Haydar for permission to use
his work, as well as to Mr. Natarov, Director of his Press
Service, for his assistance in preparing this issue of POLICY
STUDIES.
I
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Typical Features of Socialist
Growth
he Socialist model of development1 that was shaped
during the end of the 20s and beginning of the 30s in
the USSR was based on the model of import substituting
industrialization. The model highly influenced the national
way of development by moving it aside from prevailing world
trends on decades.
Let us take a closer look at the facts that caused the first such
transition in the history of economy in the USSR at the end
of the 20s.
World War I helped terminate the traditional monarchy that
led to the Revolution and Civil War caught Russia at its
highest level of early capitalistic crises (GDP per capita in
1913 was $1500 per capita evaluated in prices of 1990,
considering the parity of spending power). P. Stolypin was
more than correct when at that very stage of development, he
was asking for 20 years of peace and stability for Russia.
When the post-revolutionary Russian period of storm and
pressure from the Civil War dissolved in NEP, when they
succeeded in stabilizing the chervonets (currency) and
revival of national economy began, it became obvious that
the newly formed economic situation obtained traits of a
market economy.
As early as spring 1918, master and ideologist of Russian
industrialization professor V. Grinevitski turned his
                                                            
1 The most popular works dedicated to analyses of the socialist
model from a liberal standpoint are still Way to Slavery by F.A.
Haek (Moscow 1993) and Socialism L.F. by Mizes (Moscow 1994).
Out of contemporary works that sum up the results of socialist
experiments, the most far-reaching to my mind is research by J.
Kornai: Kornai J. The Socialist System. The Political Economy of
Communism. Oxford, 1992.-Among works dedicated to discovering
reasons of radical differences in economic dynamics at different
stages of socialist development, I would like to note: Banarjee A.,
Spagat M. Productivity Paralysis and the Complexity Problem: Why
Do Centrally Planned Economies Become Prematurely Gray? 
Journal of Comparative Economics 1991. Vol.15. P.646-660; Sachs J.
Notes on the Life Cycle of State-led Industrialization. - Japan and the
World Economy. 1996(8). P.153-174.
Removing market
mechanisms and
substituting them with
an integrated hierarchy
allows for extending
possibilities of
maneuvering the savings
rate rapidly, increasing
the dimensions of
resource redistribution
from traditional
agriculture, and
obtaining a high growth
rate of the share in
industry and industrial
production volume.
T
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attention to the fact that in the Russian revolution socialism
is just a shape, and essence is bourgeois2. Nevertheless,
socialist slogans closer to the middle of the 20s thought
persuasion about the revolution, which turned out to be
bourgeois in its social and economic content, is
strengthened both in Russian and in emigrant liberal
professors minds.
In the country works a developed system of markets. The
basic factor of economics is the private economic sector
(peasant farms, private industry and trade). Displacing the
traditional monarchy with revolutionary, a modernizing
totalitarian regime appeared. Inherited from Russian
traditions were financial stability (which was based on the
golden chervonets), expressive protectionism, and active
government participation in economic development. The
most essential innovation monopoly on external trade shows
a definite turn to the way import displaced industrialization.
Evidently the winner in the Civil War at that time was the
peasantry. They were freed then from food apportionment
(prodrasverstka) and retained landlords land. Curbing the
financial pressure that suppressed the peasantry3 showed in
peasants consumption4, sharp cutbacks of exports partly in
farming, in comparison with the prewar level. Lack of
foreign currency and limited opportunities for import were
permanent and essential problems of the Soviet economy.
The monopoly on external trade allowed for strictly limiting
consumer imports. But growth in peasants consumption did
not allow food exports to increase to the prewar level. All
attempts to force it only overbalanced the financial system
and internal market mechanisms.
This led to inevitable problems of evolution, which appeared
as soon as the very superficial reserves of national economic
revival were used up. And there was the problem again: how
to overcome strong lags in comparison with mature
economies of the West that had arisen during the war and
during the revolution? The missionary style of the
Bolsheviks ideology, interpretation of existence in terms of
                                                            
2 Grinevitski V. Outlooks of Postwar Revival in Russian Industry,
Kharkiv, 1919
3 Part of land tax and defrayment for land in earnings of peasant
farms curtailed from 9.5% 1913 to 4.9% 1926/1927. See: Davis
R.(ed) From Tzarism to the New Economic Policy. London, 1990
4In 1913, 22-25 % of produced supplies left the village, and in the
middle of the 20s such flow slowed down to 16-17% (ibid)
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fights between capitalism and socialism, and anxiety to lose
power did not allow them to postpone the decision5. The
main structural and technological priorities of development
were determined by examples of mature economies and by
Russias resources. They transformed from postwar
perspectives of Russian industry by V. Grinevitski, through
development of the GOELRO plan to the first five-year plan
that was offered by the State Planning Committee: there is a
strong necessity to recover the domestic fuel and power
industries, to restore and update metallurgy, build up
developed engineering industry, and reconstruct the prewar
volume of railway building.
But where can these resources be obtained to implement all
these projects? V. Grinevetski intended to use abundant
foreign investments. However, by the middle of the 20s it
was obvious that all attempts were in vain. Anti-capitalist
slogans assigned by political competition were too strong. It
was too recent since the Bolshevik government refused to pay
the Tzars debts and socialized the property of those
companies that participated in foreign business. Even with
all perspectives of Russian markets in mind, the risk is rather
high. Therefore, there will be no more big foreign
investments.
Peasant farms were one of the traditional dominant sources
for forming capital in Russia. But the peasant nature of the
revolution in combination with the socialist ideology makes
its usage rather problematic.
Voluntary private investments from peasant farms stay low.
Anti-capitalist propaganda makes active support for
developing and strengthening peasant farms politically
impossible. Even Bukharin, who understood this problem
more than others, was forced to withdraw the slogan Enrich
yourself. As a result, recourse of peasants savings growth
created by land reform was strongly blocked. It is senseless to
expect rational people to invest in industry development,
risking being included in a politically suspicious list, and to
be threatened with sanction and oppression. As a result,
peasant farms in the 20s became stable but not adjusted to
voluntary savings and development of the national economy.
                                                            
5 We are 50-100 years slower than progressive states. We are to run
this distance in ten years. Otherwise we are to be trampled.  J.
Stalin. Questions of Leninism. M.: OGIZ, 1939. P329
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The same problems block active production accumulation in
the private sector of the economy separately from farming.
Bolsheviks too often and too fervently apologize for allowing
the existence of that very sector, expecting strong interest of
private long-term investments. The seal of temporality,
constant ideological and political threats of the bourgeois
inspire short-term speculative trading and financial flow but
not extensive private financing of the countrys
industrialization.
In a word, the way to dynamic capitalist growth, which
fancies intensive activity of the nations private sector, and a
large private economy, was blocked for a long time by the
Revolution and Civil War.
Complex financial problems were aroused in the state sector.
Ideology (Dictate of Proletariat) forces raising wage levels. By
the end of the recovery period, with labor productivity lower
than before, revolution real wages were higher. With
powerful protectionism and weak competition, industrial
effectiveness was not high. The monopoly on external trade
allows for overstating prices, providing profit even in case of
low effectiveness. This caused constant conflict between
village and city for prices on produced goods. The standard
answer from the village is limited demand and a cutback on
the delivery of farm goods.
In the framework of capitalism and the market being not very
pleasant, one choice remains: a relatively low rate of growth
and financial stability or attempts to force state investments
at the expense of financial emission with inevitable
consequences of inflation.
Hence, in 1925-1928 a constant fluctuation of economic
policy appeared between inflationary financing and attempts
to restore standard stability, acute discussions between the
National Commissariat of Finance and State Planning
Committee about possible rates and sizes of state savings,
swelling financial instability, and inevitable problems in the
functioning market mechanism6.
The bread provision crisis of 1927, which served as grounds
to reject NEP, was directly connected with attempts to force
the rate of growth and keep the price of bread-stuffs low. As
                                                            
6 Yurovski L. Soviet Government Monetary Policy. (1917-1927) Moscow,
1996. History of the Narkomfin and Gosplan conflict is vividly
described in Mau V. Reforms and Dogmas (1914-1929). Moscow:
Delo, 1993, pp.137-152.
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in similar crises of 1923 and 1925, it yielded to being
regulated with the help of the same methods (cutback in the
savings and export volume of bread-stuffs, escalation of
purchasing prices). At the same time it illuminated a key
problem of the NEP economy, which lies in the inability to
control savings directly and at the same time maintain
market mechanisms. Such an economy and its assigned rates
of investment growth are to be bought as something given.
All attempts to influence it should be done by rather mild
methods of market economic policy.
The choice of 1927-1928, which fancied real economic and
political alternatives, is a choice of either continuing import
displacement industrialization with its internal limitations
on investment growth rates, or substituting market
mechanisms by a huge hierarchy that would allow for
controlling part of the savings in GDP directly.
In Russia, the communist government is in power. Private
property and market for them is not a necessary condition
for stable development, but a temporary bearable element of
a highly hostile system of capitalist economy. It would be
more correct to switch those regulators off, than to restrain
industrialization if all attempts to force growth lead to
instability, which hinders the work of the market mechanism.
The answer to the savings crisis was secondary enslavement
of the Russian village, and rough state savings growth at the
expense of decrease living standards among the peasantry.
Artificially understated purchasing prices and sales tax on
agricultural products became a substantial source of budget
income. Further reduction in the consumption of foodstuffs
in the village led to acute growth in agrarian export, which
was to provide the currency reserves needed for an industrial
spurt. Being formed for the first time was an integrative,
logical internal structure of socialistic industrialization.
The temporary dismantling of market mechanisms, of
course, is not a socialist invention. It was often used by
capitalist countries in case of serious collision with severe
external shock, i.e. with the war. To cover state expenditures
which drastically increased from the war, compulsory use of
peoples savings was needed. A structural shift in industry
and redistribution of resources from civil goods production
to war industry is also necessary. Maintenance of such
structural shifts using only market mechanisms (sharp price
increases on everything related with the army), leads to
severe social conflicts (capitalists make a fortune on war).
Anomalies of Socialist Growth
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A typical reaction would be to establish different forms of
price control and rationalize the most substantial resources
and goods, starting with provisions. A situation of
suppressed inflation was aroused. Aggregate demand
exceeded supply, prices were lower than equilibrium, and
there was full employment. Excess demand showed up in line
formations, empty store shelves, a black market, and halted
material and technical supply of production7. Under the
conditions of suppressed inflation, money becomes only one
lever of allotment along with cards, a system of priorities in
purveyance, etc. Forced population savings were mobilized
to cover the budget deficit.
The reaction to the deficit of industrial resources were
supply growth and weak points (bottlenecks) in production.
It was not easy to evaluate the resource deficit, therefore
resource allotment among branches and firms was far from
optimal. Rapid growth of the state machine was an inevitable
reaction to such difficulties.
In terms of war, relative simplicity of the determination of
national priorities, patriotic enthusiasm, and evidently the
temporary nature of suppressed inflation were the main
factors that allowed for controlling such problems.8
There is a principle difficulty and rather serious risk for a
state that is on the way to suppressed inflation. It is the real
ability of the state to secure wide mobilization and
redistribution of prime resources by using only extra-market
methods.
Attitude to war according to the communist experience, with
its suppressed inflation and extra-market regulations in the
20s among Bolsheviks, always remained two-sided. On one
hand, it was officially declared a temporary policy, out of
necessity caused by war conditions. On the other hand, it was
declared a policy that corresponds more with long-term
socialist orientation than a temporary flirting with the
capitalistic market.
                                                            
7 See: Charlesworth H. The Economics of Repressed Inflation. London,
1956; Kale M. Inflation. Wages and Rationing.  Studies in War
Economics. Backpool, 1947; Lerner A. The Economics of Control.
London, 1944; Novozylov V. Goods shortage. Bulletin of Finance.
¹2. 1926.
8 Galbraith J. Reflections on Price Control.  Quarterly Journal of
Economics. August 1946.
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It is no wonder that by the end of the 20s, when market
mechanisms influenced by savings crisis began to be
problematic, the ruling elite used the experience of
suppressed inflation regulation.
Again the distributing machine was formed, its role grew,
and state control over trade and the flow of goods had
intensified. Goods deficit, lines, and black market
reappeared.
In 1928, as the inflationary crisis aroused problems of bread
provision and city purveyance, the reaction was not cutbacks
in state investment to the level where it was compatible the
with normal activity of market mechanisms. Instead there
was a rejection of market mechanisms, return to the
compulsory seizure of bread-stuffs, along with organization
of a powerful administrative machine and mobilization of
material and financial resources from the village. That was
collectivization.
It is for the first time in contemporary economic history
when during peace time a new, well developed system of
administrative regulation for economic life and that
displaced the market mechanism was formed. In this case,
the place of the stimulated state goal to win the war is
replaced by the goal to force industrialization
Typical features of the new socialist model of economic growth are:
· supremacy of state property, liquidation of legal and state
independent private property;
· dominant state role in national savings mobilization, their
allotment and usage;
· organization of administrative hierarchy of complying superiors
to cover economy of the entire country and coordinate economic
activity by direct acts. Market system loses its basic role as micro-
economic regulator and moves aside of economic life;
· egalitarianism, lowering extremely high differentiation of the
income typical for young capitalism;
· overtake import displacement industrialization based on
redistribution resources from the agrarian to industrial sphere
as a basis of structural policy;
· rough political control that excludes any unsanctioned forms of
mass activity;
Anomalies of Socialist Growth
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· messiah ideology that promises a reward on Earth tomorrow for
abstinence and self-sacrificing labor today.
This set of institutional innovations9 allows for breaking the
number of limits that are imposed on the economical growth
of market mechanisms.
The size of national savings ceases to be dependant upon
magnitudes that are difficult to manage, namely private
savings and investments. A high level of taxation does not
suppress economic activity because it does not depend on
the autonomous decisions of private businesses.
Channels of capital outflow are securely shut by overall
financial control. Totalitarian political control removes the
limits on volumes of financial resources that are used for
state mobilization for savings. An extremely high and long-
term stable norm of national savings allows for securing an
industrial spurt and accelerating the rates of economic
growth.
Egalitarianism and industrial dynamics provide
demonstrative persuasion of the official ideology.
The coincidence of fast industrialization in the USSR with a
deep crisis in leading capitalistic countries from 1929-1933
brought intellectual respect to the socialist ways of solving
development problems10. It also drew the attention of
countries that faced overtaking industrialization and became
an example for them.
The specific character of the socialist model lies in the ability
of collectivization and forcible seizures of a large part of
agricultural products to cut down labor remuneration in the
traditional sector below the level of average labor efficiency.
                                                            
9 Detailed large-scale analysis of the institutional structure of a
socialist economy can be found in: Kornai J. The Socialists System.
The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford, 1992.- These lines
authors standpoints concerning internal mechanisms of a socialist
economy can be found in Economic Reforms and Structures
Hierarchy. In the future we will try to concentrate on relations
between these mechanisms within the limits of socialist growth and
the nature of post-socialist crises. From now on we will try not to
repeat that which was stated in previous works.
10 An example of the typical pessimism of the 30s  40s concerning
the abilities of capitalism to confront socialistic industrial
dynamism would be the book of brilliant economist J. Schumpeter,
who did not sympathize with socialism. Schumpeter J. Socialism,
Capitalism and Democracy. 1942.
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As a result, additional financial resources were aroused. Also,
a decrease in peasants living standards provided low wages
and a powerful flow of the labor force into the city. Both in
traditional and modern sectors, additional resources for
financing industrialization were formed.
Therefore, the socialist model allows for providing high rates
of redistributing resources from the traditional sector and
makes GDP savings rate greater than in the case of market
industrialization. State compulsion is the main instrument
that guarantees a decrease in living standards in the
traditional sector and mobilization of resources for
industrialization needs. As results from the above stated, part
of the state income in GDP for countries with socialist
industrialization is greater than in market economies.
The chosen socialist model allows for solving the
fundamental problem of market industrialization. It helps
overcome inertia and given rates of national savings.
However everything is to be paid. The market mechanisms
that were turned off, including those that are responsible for
accurate tuning, stimulus of effective use of recourses and
mechanisms of effective innovation selection, caused a
permanent high GDP resource-input ratio, particularly its
high energy-output ratio. Besides, the closed nature of the
economy means a lesser part of export and especially
processing industry export in GDP. The same happened in
countries of capitalist import displacement industrialization.
The peculiarity of the socialist model in comparison with
normal market industrialization is shown in graphs 1-311
                                                            
11 Appearance of the graphs that characterize the relations between
GDP per capita growth, GDP savings rate, GDP rate of state
expenditures and GDP export rate for market economies is
explained by the data in table 1. The peculiarity of the socialist
model (greater state expenditures and savings ratio, closed nature,
lesser GDP export rate) and low efficiency of resources in
comparison with the magnitude typical for market economies is
explained by the special logic of the socialist growth model. That
was reached by great state redistribution of resources from the
traditional sector using a swift increase of the GDP savings rate as
the result of market mechanisms cessation and economy closure.
Empirical confirmations of such an anomaly for the Soviet
economy can be found in: Ofer G. Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-
1985. Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXV (Dec. 1987).
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Graph 1. GDP savings rate
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The large-scale redistribution of financial resources from the
traditional agrarian sector to finance state-coordinated
industrialization, decrease of not very high (during early
industrialization) living standards of the peasantry, constant
agricultural stagnation against the backdrop of rapid
industrial growth, together compose a vivid distinction
between the socialist model of industrialization and the
tendencies of market economies.
As a rule, pioneers of capitalist industrialization faced an
agrarian revolution, that is, a fundamental increase in
farming productivity that preceded rapid industrial growth.
The beginning of the agrarian revolution in England was
defined as 1690-1700, in France and the U.S. as 1750-1770, in
Germany as 1750-1800. By the end of the XIX century, it took
place with the help of the traditional base, not by using
machines and fertilizers, but by improved crop rotation,
seed breeding and improved instruments of labor12. Growth
in farming production at the very beginning of the industrial
spurt fell behind industrial production growth but was
closely related to it13.
Let us make a theoretical analysis of the long-term
consequences that choosing the socialist growth model
would bring, and the internal factors that would limit the
possibility of stable development.
According to Angels law, the ratio of provisions in
consumption volume decreases when GDP per capita
increases. However, in absolute expression, expenditures on
provisions also increase when living standards increase.
                                                            
12 The Fontana Economic History of Europe. The Industrial Revolution.
London, 1978. P.466
13 By calculations of V. Meliantsev, the correlation between growth
rates for industrial and farming production in Western countries
and Japan during the period of the industrial spurt approximately
was 0.784 (Economic Long-term Growth of Western and Eastern countries.
Moscow, 1995, P.197). In those cases when by virtue of institutional
factors (first of all they were the structure of land property and
land-utilization), agrarian development slowed down serious
problems of external accounts and whole economic growth was
eventually suppressed. Information about role of agrarian
development in the industrialization process of the XIX century
one can find in Morris C., Adelman I. Comparative Patterns of
Economic Development, 1850-1914. Baltimore, 1988; Adelman I.,
Lohmoller J. Institutions and Development in the Nineteenth
Century: A Latent Variable Regression Model.  Structural Change
and Economic Dynamics. Vol.5(2).1994. P.329-359.
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Although in the case of market economy industrialization,
growth in farming production falls behind the growth of the
whole economy, it is stable for a long term and provides
provision consumption that grows. Currently the U.S. is the
greatest exporter of agricultural products in the world.
Member countries of the OECD have a trade surplus of
agricultural products that almost equals zero.
Of course, in the case of open economy and the limited part
of farming in the economic structure of agricultural industry
growth that outruns provision, consumption is not the
necessary presupposition of stable national economic
growth. Yet the general tendency looks this way.
Under the conditions of socialist industrialization, intense
redistribution from the village leads to a state when high
rates of industrialization, increase in GDP per capita,
increase of product demand take place against the
background of farming stagnation, which is deformed by the
very mechanism of initial socialist accumulation. Thus,
factors that caused abnormally high rates of socialist
industrialization (decrease in life standards of the peasantry,
maximum redistribution of resources from the traditional
agrarian sector during early industrialization) cause the most
serious long-term anomaly of socialist growth. These are
divergent ways of industrial and agricultural development.
Sooner or later the product deficit becomes a long-term
structural problem and their import becomes a rigorous
necessity. Meanwhile, economic autarchy, small part of
external trade in GDP, hinders solving the problem by
processing industrial export dynamic growth, which is
necessary for stable product export financing.
Let product consumption (d) for a socialist country per
capita increase the function of income level per capita (y):
d = f(y)
Let provisions production per capita (q) also be a function of
GDP per capita:
q = p(y)
Then provisions export(import) lP per capita is calculated
this way:
lP = p(y)  f(y)
The peculiarity of the socialist economy caused by a typically
extreme load of the traditional agrarian sector and decrease
Anomalies of Socialist Growth
Policy Studies, April 199914
of income level here during a primary industrial spurt lies in
the fact that the ratio of provision production in GDP
dwindles faster than the provision consumption ratio14
(graph 4).
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At the very beginning of socialist industrialization, when
GDP production per capita equaled y0, provisions production
q0 was greater than their consumption d0. The country was an
agricultural products exporter. Agricultural export per
capita lP0=q0  d0. With the increase of development level,
provisions consumption grows faster than declining
production and in t1y1 point export is equal to 0 (d1=q1).
Further income growth transforms the country into the
position of pure provisions importer. In point t2y2 provisions
import per capita (lP2) equals d2  q2.
For countries with import displacement industrialization,
upper borders of GDP per capita growth are set by maximum
possible stable volume of raw material export. Other
magnitudes are set by the nature of economic growth in the
network of the chosen strategy:
                                                            
14 Close political and economic relations of Eastern-European
socialist countries with the Soviet metropolis and Soviet resources
support do not allow for regarding them in the 50s  80s as
countries that were making their way of the development. It is more
correct to speak about the regional specifics of development inside
the Soviet empire, to regard it as a whole including country
satellite. Further (in chapter 4) we will check the hypotheses
formulated here by analyzing real ways of magnitudes, the same for
the USSR and China.
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ym = Cml0 + Cmlc where
ym is the maximum level of income per capita;
Cm is the maximum close of economy;
l0 is the export of processing industry per capita;
lc is raw materials industry export per capita.
The limited competitive ability of processing industry export
combines models of socialist growth and import displacing
(displacement) industrialization. By virtue of the specific
socialist agrarian sector, some necessity to guarantee
agrarian import adds to the limits, caused by the necessity of
access to the worlds techniques and exchange of
technologies.
Thereby raw material export per capita could be divided into
two components: mineral materials export (lm) and
provisions export (lP). Then the formula that determines the
highest GDP per capita level for socialism would look as
follows:
ymax = Cml0 +Cmlm+ CmlP
Since provision export (import) is determined by GDP per
capita production:
ymax = Cml0 +Cmlm + Cm [p(y)  f(y)]
At the GDP maximum extreme (ymax), provisions
consumption per capita and provisions production per
capita are fixed parts of GDP per capita and are equal to fmax
and pmax. Hence:
ymax = Cml0 +Cmlm+ Cm (pmaxymax - fmaxymax)
After a simple transformation we have:
ymax = (Cml0 +Cmlm )/ (1- Cmpmax + Cmfmax) = (Cml0 +Cmlm )/[1 + Cm
(fmax - pmax)]
Thus, while attempting to find the maximum possible
development level for the socialist model, we realized that it
also can be determined by the utmost size of processing
industry export per capita (l0) and by the level of economic
closeness (Cm). Also, it could be determined by the specific
national magnitude that is by maximum possible mineral
material export per capita (lm), GDP ratio of provisions
production(p) and consumption (f).
Considering all that has been previously said, socialist
industrialization history is to be divided into two totally
different periods.
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First. Resources of the traditional sector are not depleted yet.
Provisions production per capita is greater than provisions
consumption per capita (q>d). The country is a provisions
exporter (l0 > 0). The economy is closed, processing
industries export is limited, agricultural and mineral
materials export provides exchange earnings that are the
minimum needed for borrowing technical attainments from
developed market economies. The GDP export ratio rapidly
decreases and then stays at a rather low but stable level.
Second. The growing demand of provisions exceeded the
volume of declining national agricultural production (d>q).
Step by step, the socialist country facing danger of hungry
peoples complaints becomes net provisions importer(l0<0).
Since the processing industry is not competitive, the mineral
materials export load increases. Now it is responsible not
only for technological exchange guarantee, but also for
provisions import financing. To secure financing of
provisions import, there will be an inevitable increase in the
GDP export ratio and volume of mineral materials export
per capita (graph 5).
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In the graph are shown GDP per capita growth and
corresponding volumes of mineral export.
In the graph below y1 the nature of the line is explained by
the growing autarchy of the economy and preserved agrarian
export. Going below point y1 (where lp = 0) the mineral
export load rapidly increases. Further economic growth in
the framework of socialism (y1 to y2) is possible only when the
resource base can provide stable growth of mineral export
(lm1® lm2). At this point, GDP per capita growth takes place
The crisis of socialist
growth model starts after
basic resources of
traditional agriculture
are drained. This is
when all of its inner
limitations become
apparent  high power-
consumption, low
borrowing power of the
process industrys
production, absence of
structural shift
mechanisms within the
framework of the
economys modern sector,
low effectiveness of
investments. The totality
of these factors makes for
a trend towards a rapid
fall in the capital
productivity ratio and in
the economic growth rate.
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against the background of growing provisions import and
corresponding mineral export growth. Exhaustion of further
opportunities of mineral export growth (lm1) determines the
limits of possible country development as to the socialist
model for the corresponding national economy.
A peculiarity of socialist growth is its power consumption.
This includes not only stable growth of energy consumption
per capita, but also a continuous declination of energy
return. Comparing the rates of GDP growth in the USSR
1940-198515 and the rates of energy consumption growth16 we
realize that in each of the mentioned periods, rates of energy
consumption growth exceeded rates of economic growth.
Table 1. GDP and energy consumption growth
in the USSR
19401960 19611970 19711980 19811985
GDP growth 2,16 1,66 1,20 1,104
Energy consumption
growth
2,97 1,69 1,54 1,123
This peculiarity is more substantial since the decrease of
GDP power consumption as a rule goes with economic
growth in market economies(graph 6).
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15 Ofer G. Soviet Economic Growth (1928-1985). Journal of Economic
Literature. Vol.XXV (December 1987). P.1778
16 National Economy of the USSR over 70 years. Moscow, 1987.
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Then it is possible to assume that by virtue of its internal
logic (rejection of market mechanisms) socialist economic
growth has two more limiting magnitudes: maximum
possible GDP production per unit of energy consumption
and maximum size of energy production per capita
determined by the countrys resource base (graph 7).
In the graph, where line y0y1 presents energy consumption
per capita growth with the growth of GDP per capita in
market economies, e0 presents national energy production
per capita, e0e1 presents energy supply import per capita. The
open nature of a market economy allows for financing energy
requirements that emerge after point y1 at the expense of
processing industry export. Line y0y2 is the dynamics of the
mutual dependence of GDP production per capita and
energy consumption per capita for a socialist economy (with
production that consumes more energy). Its closed nature
and limited processing industry export make the size of
national energy resource production per capita (e2) the
upper limit of production and consumption per capita
growth (y2).
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Energy export dominates in the structure of global mineral
trade. Thereby, one can draw a conclusion that when primary
industrialization resources are exhausted and the country
becomes an importer of agricultural products, its fuel-and-
                                                            
17 Lines y0y1 and y0y2 on the graph are determined by the differences
in the dynamics of energy consumption for socialist and market
economies. Differences were discussed earlier.
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energy sector is double loaded. Firstly, energy export growth
is a necessary condition for the export of provisions and
technological exchange growth. Secondly, GDP energy
intensity, which does not decrease, requires constant growth
of internal energy consumption as fast as economic does18.
Opportunities of socialist development after agrarian
resources are exhausted are set by an upper limit of stable
energy resources production per capita.
Therefore, it is obvious why a crisis of socialist growth begins
in poor resource countries during a relatively earlier stage
of industrialization than in countries which are provided
with resources. For poor resource countries it starts at a
stage when big labor reserves are still preserved with
marginal efficiency in a traditional sector equaling 0. In the
case of tight resource limits, the redistribution of these
resources into labor intensive branches of processing
industry is the only sensible strategy. Growth of home
processing industry competitive power is a precondition of
strategic success. To achieve this, an open economy and
returned market mechanisms are needed. If industrial
potential were saved, this process would take place against
the background of industrial growth.
A country with poor resources, after an initial industrial
spurt which allowed them to increase the conservation ratio,
form an industrial structure, and advance the education
level, has the opportunity to enter a basic way of
development at the expense of preserving resources in the
traditional sector. This may happen if countries promptly
change their economic slogans and references. Resource-rich
countries have the opportunity in the frame of socialism to
take a rather long way of industrial development, the same
                                                            
18 One can think of the development of Eastern European socialist
countries as an exception to this rule. The fact is that because of
close political and economic relations between those countries and
the USSR, it is not correct to regard them as independent
economies. They were naturally integrated into the Soviet empires
economic development structure. They were provided with the
empires resources and shared its fate. National ways of
development for Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. during the
50s  80s just could not be realized at that time without the
resource base of the USSR. Thereupon, here and further under the
name of resource-poor socialist countries we would mean only
those a)that have a low maximum possible size of stable raw
material export; b) that do not have any chance to be supported by
the resource base of a rather rich metropolis.
Greater rigidity of
resource limitations
incites countries with
poor resources to leave the
framework of the socialist
growth model during the
early stages of
development, when they
still possess sizeable
reserves of cheap man
power with zero ultimate
output in the traditional
sector. Countries rich in
resources have the
opportunity to respond to
the crisis of early socialist
industrialization with
increasing mineral export
and agricultural import.
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with the model of import displacement industrialization.
And only very rich countries can invest the biggest piece of
cake into war industry (as the USSR did). Yet when chances
to grow in the frame of the socialist model are exhausted, the
market mechanism start for them is rather difficult and it
takes place against the background of an acute crisis that was
formed inside socialism and does not fit the market structure
of the economy.
The peculiarity of mutual relations between the economy
and politics determines one more fundamental problem that
is way out of socialism for countries with different levels of
resource provisions.
A socialist country poor in resources in the frame of the
socialist model runs up to a level of economic development
where it is almost impossible for powerful democratic
processes to be formed. On the contrary, a rich country is
able to raise production per capita and consumption per
capita indicators to the level that is natural for a stable
democracy, to form social and economic preconditions of
democracy. So we can assume that for a country rich in
resources, the probability of a serious political crisis of a
totalitarian regime is bigger than for countries with poor
resources.
Let us try to check the formulated hypotheses about
anomalies of socialist growth using actual material.
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Industrialization and Exhaustion
of Resources for Socialist Growth
in the USSR and China
n the USSR, economic policy during 1929-1934, which was
the period of the first industrial spurt, was based on a
decline in peasants consumption and heavy withdrawal of
resources from the countryside.
In order to determine how many resources could be taken
from the agrarian sector, very strict means were applied.
That was the trial-and-error method, since ancient times used
for determining the amount of levy19. In the early 1930s the
price paid for errors was the lives of millions of people who
died of starvation. Redistribution of resources from
agriculture to other fields was being fulfilled at the cost of a
sudden reduction in the rural populations living standards,
hastened migration from the countryside to the city, and
increased grain export (even though the manufacture of
grain was decreasing) which allowed for increasing
equipment import.
The USSR exported 4.8 million tons of grain in 1930, 5.2
million tons in 1931, and 1.8 million tons in 193220. The total
value of products and foodstuffs exported amounted to 80%
of the equipment imported in 1929-193221.
Accumulated foreign currency reserves were as much
concentrated on purchasing manufacturing resources as was
possible. The share of consumers import (which was 16.2%
of total import in 1925-1926) decreased to 4.6% in 1931. The
import of clothes, footwear, and foodstuffs was minimized.
                                                            
19 This is an additional tax, which is to be paid by peasants for the
sake of development; industry supplies in the whole country
including countryside. This is a kind of levy, a kind of super-tax;
we are forced to take it so that we could keep and evolve the
present rate of industry growth- About Industrialization and Bread
Problem. Stalin I.V. (Writings. Volume 11. P.159)
20 The Industrialization of USSR in 1929-1932. Documents and material.
Moscow, 1970, p. 104-105
21 Building the foundation of socialist economy in USSR. 1926-1932
Moscow, 1960. P. 522, 528
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The share of raw materials for light industry in import was
abruptly reduced as well (from 33.8% in 1925-1926 tio 9.3%
in 1931). At the same time, the share of equipment and raw
materials for heavy industry increased from 36.2% in 1925-
1926 to 82.1% in 1931 and 85.2% in 193222. Import of ferrous
metals, machines and apparatuses, benches, electrical
equipment, engines, fine mechanics goods was of
fundamental importance for industrialization.
Only in 1932 did a boom in petroleum export exceed the
value of grain export. Nevertheless even in the second half of
the 1930s, agricultural export, along with petroleum and
timber, determined the countrys ability to import.
Redistribution of resources from agriculture had a
determining influence upon financing the investment
programs of the first five-year plan. By decree of the All-
Russian Central Executive Committee, on April 21, 1928 the
Agricultural Tax Law was passed, according to which the
taxation of kulak individual farms was sharply increased. In
practice this law was being used as a retaliatory measure
against those peasants who didnt want to become kolkhoz,
or collective farm members. That is why tax was collected by
individual order and general information about a farms
income instead of collecting it on account of general rates of
profitability.
But the main part was played by another key factor  turnover
tax. By decree of the Central Executive Committee and
People's Commissar Council of the USSR on September 2,
1930, 54 previously used payments (excise-duty, trade tax,
revenue from selling special goods reserves, timber tax, etc.)
were combined into turnover tax. The base of this tax
became extremely understated, obviously confiscating the
purchase prices of agricultural products sold by collective
farms.
In 1931-1932 turnover tax accounted for more than half of
the total budget revenue (50.7% in 1931, 56.9% in 1932).
Proceeds from payments, later combined into turnover tax,
came to 3.1 milliard rubles in 1928-1929, 11.7 billion in 1931,
and 19.6 billion in 1932. Taxes accounted for 42.5 billion
rubles in 1928,1929,1932 economic years. The budget
                                                            
22 Ibid. P. 524-528
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expenditure on industry, transport and agriculture made up
44.8 billion rubles for those very years23.
The rapid increase in budget revenue cannot be explained
without taking into account the anomalous agricultural price
movements. Due to active use of emission for financing the
national economy, the growth of retail prices was hastened.
In 1928-1937 they rose 6.4 times as large. The retail price of
wheat flour rose from 10.5 kopecks/kg in the beginning of
1927 to 4 rubles 60 kopecks in the beginning of 1937. At the
same time, growth in the purchase price of grain already
stopped in 1929-1930; agricultural products were collected as
a levy. In fact, the quota purchase prices of smooth wheat
were equal to 7.6 and 7.7 kopeks/kg correspondingly in
1928-1929 and in 1931-1932; of rye they were 5.5 k/kg. In
1935 turnover tax accounted for 90.5% of the wheat flour
release price. The all-union association Zagotzerno alone
paid to the budget 7.7 billion rubles in turnover tax in 1934
and 24 billion rubles in 1935, after recurrent retail prices
grew24. The share of state expenditure in GDP was quickly
increasing (table 2 and diagram 8).
The redistribution of resources from agriculture resulted in
cutting down the amount of grain left in country for food
needs, sterns and seeds by 7-8 million tons, or 15%
comparing to the level of 1927-1928. Collectivization and a
stern shortage were the major factors of the cattle breeding
crisis.
Grain manufacture, which amounted to an average of 76
million tons in 1928-1930, varied at a level of less than 70
million tons in 1931-1934; only in prewar years was the pre-
collectivization level reached. Cattle declined from 60.1
million heads to 47.8 in 1928-1940. Dispossession of the
kulaks and famine and repression in the early 1930s
appreciably brought down the population growth rate, but it
couldnt be stopped at that stage of industrialization. An
increase in population by 20 million people from 1926-39
accompanied by stagnation in agriculture caused a decrease
in food manufacture per head by roughly 15%.
                                                            
23 Plotnykov K. Studies of Soviet State Budget History Moscow, 1955. P.
106, 111, 114, 133
24 Malafeev A. The History of Rice Formation in the USSR (1917-1963).
Moscow, 1964. P. 129, 181, 182, 393, 403, 407.
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Table 2. Share of state expenditure in GDP
in the USSR*
Year Per capita GDP** Share of state
expenditure
in GDP (%)
1923/1924 285 12,6
1929/1930 368 28,7
1935 481 39,1
1940 603 47,9
1950 681 58,9
1955 794 45,5
1960 946 39,8
1965 1103 40,8
1970 1331 41,0
1975 1468 43,9
1980 1539 47,6
1985 1606 49,7
1990 1640 51,3
*Figures on per capita GDP  according to S.Sinelnikovs calculation
based on A.Meddisons data (see Meddison A. Monitoring the World
Economy 1820-1992. Paris, 1995) and that of the State Statistics
Committee (1923-1924). Figures on the share of state expenditure in
GDP - according to S.Sinelnikovs calculation based on data by the State
Statistics Committee and Ministry of Finance.
**Dollars of 1964
Simultaneously massed investments into industrial
production (supported by resource flow from agriculture)
allowed for obtaining high growth rates. Official figures
given by the Central Statistics Department for that period
(average of 16.8% per year in 1928-1940) give rise to well-
founded doubts. Although even the adjusted subject to
realistic deflator figures received by the researcher of the
socialist industrialization (from 10-14% average percentage
per year in 1928-194025) are abnormally high.
In 1928 the USSRs GDP was similar to Russias GDP in 1913,
but the export was half the size.
                                                            
25 Davis R., Harrison M. Wheatarobt S. (eds.) The Economic
Transformation of the Soviet Union. 1913-1945. Cambridge, 1994.
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Graph 8. Budget expenditure, revenue and deficit
of the USSR
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*Extraordinary high (even for socialist trajectory) budget expenditure in
1940 - early 1950 are conditioned by the war and post-war reconstruction
of the national economy
Thus, in the USSR in the 1930s the first characteristic feature of the
socialist growth model became evidently apparent: diverging
trajectories of industrial and agricultural development, exceptionally
high industrial growth rates against a background of crisis and
efficiency stagnation in agriculture.
Collectivization allowed for removing market limitations on
crop mobilization and export. Yet export growth appeared to
be extremely unstable (table 3). It was impeded by trade
barriers, an extremely unfavorable conjuncture at basic
export markets. The chronic shortage of foreign currency
had to be covered by broad gold export, by economizing
strictly and rejecting foreign expert services. No data
confirms the Soviet governments deliberate willingness to
limit foreign trade.
Conversely, the first five-year plan assumed forced raising of
the rate of export. But the way events were developing
pushed the economy to the other side. Despite exerting every
effort to increase export revenues, not only foreign trade
part of GDP was falling, but also the absolute volume of
foreign trade turnover.
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Table 3. The USSRs foreign trade*
millions of golden rubles
Year Export Import
1913 1506 1375
1928 796 953
1929 924 881
1930 1036 1059
1931 811 1105
1932 575 704
1933 470 348
1934 418 232
1935 367 241
1936 310 309
1937 376 292
1938 293 313
1939 133 214
1940 356 313
*1913  Russia is in borders of the corresponding year
Data by the State Statistics Committee
The level of per capita GDP in the USSR in the late 1930s
(when socialist industrialization had already made its mark
on the structural characteristics of the Soviet economy) was
similar to that in Japan of those years26 or in Italy before
World War I. However, the structure of the ultimate use of
Soviet GDP differs radically from Italian or Japanese (table
4).
An extremely low share of personal consumption allows for
both securing high levels of savings and broad state
consumption (first of all armament expenditure). Besides,
the share of state consumption in the USSR was essentially
understated, owing to the existing price structure (especially
arms prices).
Japan before World War II and Italy in the beginning of the
century had similar shares of foreign trade in GDP
(correspondingly 29.5 and 28.1%.)27 In the USSR this share is
                                                            
26 Estimations of Japanese per capita GDP at that time exceed
estimations of Soviet per capita GDP over a range of 10-30%.
27 Kuznets S. Ibid. p. 312.
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extremely hard to estimate because of the drastic differences
between internal and external prices, but according to any
estimation it cannot exceed 5%.
Table 428
Countries Personal
consumption
State
consumption
Gross national
savings
USSR (1937) 54,9 22,5 22,6
Italy (1901-1910) 78,5 5,6 18,1
Japan (1938) 60,7 11,5 27,8
Thus, socialist growth, especially at the stage of the first
industrial spurt, not only reproduces the anomalies of
import-substituting industrialization, but also radically
intensifies it.
When after World War II a system of socialist countries vassal
to the USSR was formed in Eastern Europe, they in full
measure used the Soviet experience of industrialization,
taking into account national specific characters to some
extent.
Close economic contacts between countries-members of the
Economic Mutual Aid Council and the USSR, non-discretion
of Eastern socialist states (except for the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) in everything that concerned
economic policy, the non-market nature of those contacts (as
it has already been mentioned) do not permit regarding
them as countries having independent strategies of
development in 1950-1980. We could rather speak about
vassal economies, whose destinies were closely connected to
the destiny of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, China, even
when keeping as politically and economically close as
possible to the USSR, retained all the distinguishing features
of an independent state and carried out independent
economic policy.
By the time the civil war was over and the communist regime
consolidated in 1949, Chinas socio-economic situation was
quite different from that of the USSR in the early 1920s29.
                                                            
28 Data concerning Italy  Kuznets S. Modern Economic Growth. New
Haven, 1966. P. 237, 238; concerning USSR  Davis R., Harrison M.
Wheatarobt S. (eds.) The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union.
1913-1945. Cambridge, 1994. P. 272; concerning Japan  Minami R.
The Economic Development of Japan. New York, 1986. P. 174.
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The standard of industrial development was appreciably
lower. In 1913 Russia had already left behind four decades of
intensive growth, and was on the verge of coming out of an
early industrial stage. In China the process of
industrialization was fragmentary, the country (with the
exception of few regions) had never known a period of
steady industrial growth. In 1937 (just before the war with
Japan started) Chinese per capita GDP was approximately 2.5
times as small as Russias in 1913.
When estimating the scopes of production and consumption
caused by World War I, revolution and civil war, a higher
former standard of development in Russia should be taken
into consideration. In China this fall (connected with World
War II and the civil war) was not so strongly pronounced, as
it followed a prolonged period of economic stagnation. That
is why the reduction process was appreciably more important
for the USSR than for China.
The USSR was the first country to follow the path of socialist
industrialization, its pioneer. Chinese communist elite had
an opportunity to interpret the lessons of Soviet
development critically and adapt them to the specific
conditions in their country. Although in 1949-1957, leaders
of the Communist Party of China never called in question
the expediency of using Soviet experience in the field of
industrialization; from the very outset Mao Tse Tung was not
disposed to blindly imitating Soviet recipes.
The existence of a neighboring union socialist state allowed
The Peoples Republic of China to rely not only on Soviet
experience in the field of industrialization, but also on
technical and resources potential of the USSR when
developing their industrialization strategy.
Yet, even in view of all the differences in base conditions, the
course of events in China during 1949-1954 bears a strong
resemblance to the economic history of the USSR in 1921-
1927.
The basic cause of the pre-revolutionary regimes weakness
and instability lied in the fact that land tax went beyond the
control of Guomindangs (National Peoples Party) central
government and became regional. The termination of civil
                                                                                                                  
29 About the economic situation in China by the time the
Communists won the civil war see: Lin Ta-Chung and Yan Kung
Chia. The Economy of Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic
Development, 1933-1955. Princeton, 1965.
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war and political stabilization created the necessary
prerequisites for increasing the efficiency of the fiscal
system, contributed to augmenting the state revenue share of
GDP. In 1950 the central authority took strict control over
agricultural tax, as well as the totality of indirect taxes
(analogue - restoration of budget revenue in the Russian
Soviet Federate Socialist Republic of 1921-1922). The
increase in budget revenue allows restraining hyperinflation,
restoring price stability30 (analogue  the USSR in 1922-
1924). The peasant tinge of the revolution became apparent
in land reform, confiscation of large-scale land and their
distribution among peasants. On the whole, 43% of
cultivated land was distributed, and 60% of the rural
population was affected by the tax increase (1950-1952).
According to available estimations, approximately 2 million
landowners were killed in the course of those measures31. (In
Russia, a similar process had its place during the civil war).
Inner economic mechanisms stayed mainly market; at the
same time the share of state property was scaled up, and the
control of resource flows was toughened.
Both the confiscation of foreign trade companies and
initiation of state control for external economic activities
played a part similar to that of establishing a foreign trade
monopoly in the USSR, though in China the regulation was
milder at first.
In industry and transport, the reconstruction of war-
destroyed industrial enterprises and communications were
considered a priority. Only from 1953 was a new broad
industrial construction developed in close collaboration with
the USSR.
Just as in the USSR, abysmal distrust towards private property
and rich farms, as well as striving for owning a reliable
instrument for withdrawing resources from the countryside,
stimulated measures for developing cooperative farming
controlled by the state. The problem of providing
industrialization with resources got entangled with the grain
purchase crisis.
In 1951-1952 the rate of grain production growth was
abnormally high (average of 11.5% annually). The first five-
                                                            
30 The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 14. Cambridge, 1987. P. 150-
151.
31 Lardy N. Agriculture in Chinas Modern Economic Development.
Cambridge, 1983.
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year plan assumed dynamic grain production as well as
purchase growth (5.3% annually in 1953-1957). But in 1953-
1954 the growth of grain and farm commodities production
declined badly (up to 2.5% in 1953 and 1.6% in 1954 for
grain). Cotton production declined those years (by 9%
annually). The deceleration of agricultural growth called into
question the whole strategy of the first five-year plan32.
Agricultural export was the main source of arrivals and
foreign currency, needed for purchasing imported
equipment. Besides, the slow growth in agricultural
production along with state interference in the grain
markets function in 1953 caused a crisis of state grain
procurements and grain supply, considerably advanced
prices at rural markets, and a deficit of provisions in cities.
Facing this problem, the Chinese guide, as well as the earlier
Soviet guide, was to choose between increasing purchase
prices, redistributing investment resources in favor of the
consumer sector, decreasing savings or intensifying pressure
upon the peasantry. At the end of 1953, the second variant
was chosen: the introduction of a system of compulsory
agricultural production purchases at fixed prices and
temperate acceleration of cooperative farming.
Those measures allowed for increasing the volume of grain
purchases from 17-22 million tons, keeping up the growth
rate of industrialization and investments. But stagnant
agricultural production gave rise to natural doubts about
whether compulsory agricultural production purchase in
itself would deal with the problem of the mobilization of
agriculture resources. Hence, this called for striving to
increase the growth rate of co-operation and strengthen
control over the countryside. The natural resistance of the
rural population caused compulsion and political
discrimination. New-founded cooperative farms were the
first to suffer from attempts to increase grain purchases at
any price (1954-1955). A sharp debate about further
development of agrarian policy followed, which was
concluded with a peculiar compromise. The growth rate of
collectivization was sharply increased, so that by 1956 an
overwhelming majority of farms has been combined into the
cooperative farms. However, in order to slacken social
tension in the countryside and alleviate resistance by the
rural population toward compulsory collectivization, the
                                                            
32 Walker K. Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China.
Cambridge, 1984.
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volume of state purchases were decreased in comparison
with 1953-195433.
As a result, a potent fall of agriculture (characteristic for the
period of broad collectivization in the USSR) was avoided
those years in China. Still the fundamental problems of
socialist accumulation were not settled. As could be awaited,
compulsory collectivization by no means brought growth of
the agricultural production volume or efficiency. The growth
rate of agricultural production in 1956-1957 was lower than
during previous years. Meanwhile, the urban population
grew from 83-106 million people in 1952-1957. An all-
embracing rationing system was introduced in the summer
of 1955. The restriction of agricultural production purchases
(39.8 million tons in 1957, that is, 1% less in comparison
with 1954) signified, that the problem of mobilizing
resources to supply cities and finance industrialization were
not solved.
Following its own path, in 1957 China faced the necessity of
choosing a strategy of further development (the USSR faced
a similar choice in 1927-1928): either confine the growth rate
of investments in heavy industry, reinforce attention focused
on agriculture and light industry, confine the volume of
compulsory agricultural products purchases, renew stimuli
towards increasing agricultural production efficiency, and
decidedly reject the model of reinforcing industrialization at
the cost of the peasantry (in China among the adherents of
that way were developers of the second five-year plan and
leading economists, such as Peking Universitys rector Ma
Inchoo34), or give up the policy of coquetting with the
peasantry and use fully the machinery of state compulsion for
the purpose of mobilizing country resources. The chosen
strategy of a great leap forward stood for a resolute turn to
socialist industrialization.
The course of events in China during 1958-1963 bore a
strong resemblance to the trend of developments in the
USSR during 1929-1934 (tables 5-11)35.
                                                            
33 The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 14. Cambridge, 1987. P. 162-
171
34 The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 14. Cambridge, 1987. P. 180-
184.
35 Data concerning the USSR is provided by the Central Statistics
Department  State Statistics Committee; concerning China - The
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Table 5. Grain yields and state grain purchases
during the first years of socialist industrialization
in the USSR
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Grain yield
(million tons))
73,3 71,7 83,5 69,5 68,4 67,6
State purchases
(million tons)
10,8 16,1 22,1 22,8 18,5 22,6
State purchases
(% of yield)
19,7 22,5 26,4 32,8 27,0 33,4
Table 6. Grain yields and state purchases
in China during first years of socialist
industrialization
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Grain yield
(million tons)
195,0 200,0 178,0 143,5 169,0 170,0 187,5 194,0
State purchases
(million tons)
48,7 58,8 67,4 51,1 40,5 38,1 43,5 47,4
State purchases
(% of yield)
25,0 29,4 39,6 35,6 25,3 22,4 23,2 24,5
Table 7. Grain export during collectivization
years in the USSR
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Grain export (million tons) 0,18 4,76 5,06 1,77 1,69
Table 8. Grain export during the great leap
forward in the People's Republic of China
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Grain export
(million tons)
2,1 2,8 4,2 2,7 1,3 1,0 1,5
Net grain export
(without import)
(million tons)
1,9 2,7 4,2 2,7 -4,5 -3,9 -4,5
                                                                                                                  
Cambridge History of China. Vol. 14. Cambridge, 1987; Lardy N.
Agriculture in Chinas Modern Economic Development. Cambridge, 1983.
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Table 9. Per capita consumption in the USSR
kg/person annually
Urban Rural
1928 1932 1928 1932
Grain 174,40 211,30 250,40 214,60
Potatoes 87,60 110,00 141,10 125,00
Meat and meat products 51,70 16,90 24,80 11,20
Butter 2,97 1,75 1,55 0,70
Table 10. Per capita grain consumption
in China
kg/person annually
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Urban 196,0   192,5 180,8   
Rural 204,5 201,0 183,0 156,0 153,5  159,5 178,5
Table 11. Peasant revenues from collective farms
in China (1956-1962)
yen per year
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Current prices 43,1 40,5 41,4 37,6 41,3 48,1 46,1
Constant prices
(1957)
45,5 40,5 40,5    34,9
As has already been mentioned above, the major
characteristic feature of socialist industrialization lies in the
abrupt limitation of the rural populations consumption,
and in the policy of drawing out the highest possible volume
of resources from traditional sectors. The peasant
revolution, which paved the way to socialist experiment, was
concluded with the enslavement of peasants and restoration
of the strictest exploitation norms, typical for traditional
agrarian society.
Extremely strict forms of exploitation, applied in the
Chinese countryside at the preceding stage, simultaneously
stimulated a high tempo of migration into cities by the most
socially active and mobile groups, and deformed traditional
peasant ethics. Under market industrialization conditions,
the eldest son usually inherits the farm, and these for whom
there is not enough land form the base of the urban labor
force; under the conditions of socialism, the countryside is
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left by everyone who has the opportunity  that is, by the
most competent and active.
In collective farms a general system among agrarian society is
formed in which intensive and productive gardens next to
the houses become the main source of consumption for
peasant families, while work in the collective farm becomes
statute labor, accompanied by the traditional peasants
attitude toward such work. Hence the low effectiveness of
collective farm production.
After World War II the USSR kept heading toward drawing
out the highest possible volume of resources from
agriculture. The gap between purchasing and retail
provisions prices ran up to the maximum. Now statute labor
was being supplemented with in-kind and monetary tributes
levied from homestead lands (obligation to deliver crops and
homestead lands taxation). In 1948-1950 the average two-
month monetary salary was only sufficient for buying 1 kg of
butter36.
By the beginning of 1950s it became evident that the model
of early socialist industrialization based on using agricultural
resources was coming to an end in the USSR. Grain harvests
of 1948-1952 were approximately equal to those of 1928-1930
(correspondingly 77.9 and 76.1 million tons). But as the
population increased, per capita provision with foodstuffs
continued falling. The low productivity of agriculture and
deficit of foodstuffs became so manifest, that after Stalins
death there was no controversy among Soviet high leaders
concerning the cruel necessity for radical changes in agrarian
policy. Everybody agreed with the need to raise purchasing
prices, lower taxation, and increase the amount of
investments into agriculture.
The story of Khruschevs agrarian policy, its primary
successes and following collapses exceeds the limits of this
works theme. Only three circumstances deserve being
mentioned here:
1. The collective farm system, which demonstrated high
efficiency as a tool for withdrawing agricultural resources
during preceding stages, appeared to be little suited for
rational utilization of assets granted to agriculture by
Khruschev and his successors.
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2. Despite this evident fact, the USSRs leaders have never
discussed the question of dismantling the collective farm
system; the only reaction to the provision crisis lied in wide
grain purchases from abroad, supported by raw material
export.
3. The rich resource base of the USSR allowed it to rely on
supplying the population with foodstuffs and supporting
agriculture itself at the expense of raw materials export. The
reserves of socialist growth still were not exhausted in the
USSR at that time.
In the early 1960s, the part of traditional sectors used in
mobilizing financial resources for industrialization was
drained. State agricultural subsidies came to take the place of
rapidly reducing turnover tax. In 1958 the volume of
agricultural import became comparable to the volume of
agricultural export. In 1960 the USSR started purchasing
considerable amounts of grain abroad (table 12).
During these years the number of workers in industry
equaled the number of workers in agriculture, as well as the
number of urban population to the number of rural
population. Rendered lifeless by socialist industrialization,
agriculture grew into a long-term problem, and it devoured
more and more resources, using them with undoubtedly
(taking into account the past history) low efficiency. Because
it wasnt possible to effectively control migration from the
village to the city by merely administrative sanctions, the
government had to increase the rural populations standard
of living little by little, to spread social guarantees (once
available only for city dwellers) over the rural people.
The connection between the fluctuation in socialist
industrializations dynamics and the redistribution
agricultural resources can be clearly seen in the economic
history of Eastern Europe countries.
Exhaustion of the possibility to scoop resources from
traditional sectors changes the economic situation radically.
The boundary of the early 1960s in the USSR was the time
when economic advantages of withdrawing broad resources
from agriculture were replaced with the strong necessity to
pay for the forms and scales of that withdrawal. The applied
socialist industrialization model starts showing its painful
long-term after-effects.
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Table 12. Grain Import and Export of the USSR
million tons
Years Import Export
1909-1913 (on average per year)  10,5
1930  4,8
1940 0,1 1,2
1950 0,2 2,9
1960 0,2 5,8
1961 0,7 7,5
1962 0,0 7,7
1963 3,0 6,2
1964 7,2 3,5
1965 6,3 4,8
1966 7,7 4,0
1967 2,1 6,3
1968 6,1 5,4
1969 0,6 7,4
1970 2,2 5,6
1971 3,5 8,7
1972 15,5 4,6
1973 24,0 4,8
1974 7,2 7,0
1975 15,8 3,6
1976 20,6 1,5
1980 29,4 1,7
1985 45,6 1,7
Data provided by Exportkhleb
The fact that the chronic crisis of collective farming and
shortage of foodstuffs were a severe structural problem of the
socialist economy was as clear to Maos successors in the late
1970s as it was to Stalins in Russia in 1953.
In CPR the production of food grain per one worker in
agriculture, which was 946.5 kg/person in 1952 and 1,010
kg/person in 1957, declined to 972 kg/person in 197637. For
data concerning consumption per capita, see table 13.
                                                            
37 Li Chengnui and Zhang Zhuoynuan. An Outline of Economic
Development (1977-1980) in Chinas Socialist Modernization. Bejing,
1982. P. 12.
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Table 1338. Per Capita Consumption in China
(per year)¦
1957 1978
Grain (kg) 203,0 196,5
Oil (kg) 2,4 1,6
Cotton fabrics (feet) 19,5 19,1
The reaction of Chinese leaders to this problem was quite
similar to the past reaction of Soviet leaders. In 1970-1976
Chinas import purchases of grain were approximately equal
to 2.25 million tons. In order to gather foreign currency
needed for purchasing foodstuffs and importing production
equipment, China also tried to increase raw materials
production and export, mainly oil (growth from 0.2 million
tons in 1970 to 13.3 million tons in 1980). But resource
limitations were too strict and evident for China to follow
that way. By the end of the 1970s the crisis of power
engineering turned into one more critical problem for the
Chinese economy.
In 1976 the coal deficit amounted to 10 million tons. In 1977
one quarter of industrial enterprises and 20-30% of
industrial equipment worked with lowered power because of
fuel and energy shortages. China owned farming equipment
with a total productive capacity of 200 million horsepower,
but a limited supply of diesel oil allowed for using it only 1-2
months39.
A substantial component of the fuel and energy crisis was
inefficient use of utilities, a trend peculiar to socialism.
Energy consumption in China in 1976 was almost equal to
that of Japan, while GDP was three times lower.
In 1977-1980 attempts were made to mould economic
growth, including those based on importing complete
plants, but they struck against strict resource limitations. It
was found out that if all capacities specified by contracts were
put into action, the national economy could by no means be
supplied with enough power resources. Though the share of
power engineering in the structure of investments was
increasing (18.0% in 1971-1975, 21.4% in 1977, 23.7% in
                                                            
38 Lardy N. Agriculture in Chinas Modern Economic Development.
Cambridge, 1983.
39 San Shangqing and Chen Shengchang. Set Up of Production in
Chinas Socialist Modernization. Bejing, 1982. P. 164-166.
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1978), the poor resource base was not able to satisfy the
requirements of the power-consuming national economy. As
early as in the beginning of 1970 the excessive exploitation of
oil-fields and lack of balance between the volume of mining
and explored resources bear their consequences. It becomes
evident that not only intensifying production, bur also
keeping it at a steady rate is not easy. Coal and petroleum
mining decreased in 1980.
Thus, the difference between China in 1970 and the USSR in 1950
lied in the fact that China at once faced three factors that placed
obstacles in the way of its growth in the framework of socialism: a)
agricultural crisis and chronic shortage of foodstuffs; b) impossibility
to provide high growth rates of energy production in order to satisfy the
requirements of a power-consuming economy; c) limited possibility of
increasing raw materials export for ensuring food purchases and
machine-building import. This was followed with lower rates of
industrialization and huge free labor resources in the
countryside. The logic of the economic situation literally
pushed the Chinese government towards the path of
profound reforms and abandoning the socialist development
model, no matter what its ideological prejudice contained40.
In the USSR, where a rich resource base didnt confine socialist
growth, as a result of the crisis of the early socialist growth model
(based on broad resource redistribution from agriculture) came a
considerable modification of socio-economic structures, the formation
of so-called highly developed, ripe socialism.
While the same political and ideological appearance was
preserved, the basic characteristics of socio-economic
development underwent qualitative changes in comparison
to those typical for the beginning of socialist accumulation.
The fundamentals of social consensus, which secures the
stability of the present political institutes system, were
                                                            
40 The above stated certainly doesnt imply that the USSR would
have repeated precise Chinas development trajectory provided it
had had poorer resources, or that Chinas development would be
identical with Soviet if it only had had richer resources. Vital
differences in traditions, dominating norms of behavior inherited
from agrarian society inevitably give unique, specific traits to the
market evolution of the countries (see, e.g.: Vasiliev L. Confucian
Civilization. Asia and Africa Today. 1996. #2. P. 26-37). The above
stated is about something else. Irrespectively of the countrys
specificity different provision with resources becomes a significant
factor, which determines the level of development when potential
of socialist growth is exhausted.
Leaving socialism with
preserving economic
growth is possible only at
early stages of
industrialization, when
the potential of the
traditional peasant sector
is retained, on whose base
market economy (parallel
to that of the state) will
grow (as it was in
China). After basic
reserves of the traditional
sector are exhausted, any
strategy aiming toward
renewing market growth
demands serious
structural reorganization
of the modern industrial
sector and is inevitably
followed by a fall in
production volume.
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changing. While during the period of industrialization,
political structures rest mainly upon the most mobile groups
able to adapt themselves to the rapidly changing economic
conditions that clear the way to fast social advance, then
during the following years, resting upon groups oriented
toward preserving status quo plays a more important part.
Correspondingly, in ideology the accent little by little shifts
from stereotypes of a hostile encirclement and radiant
future to stability and social guarantees. Not till this phase
did the well-known thesis appear about sobes (based on
social guarantees) the nature of socialism, in which weak
motives to work are the consequence of a surplus of social
guarantees, but not immanent features of the socialist
economic mechanism.
At that time an image of late socialist economy was being
formed, which contained the fall of economic growth rates
against a background of conservatism for production
structures formed during previous stages. However, the
running costs of outdated and ineffective factories and
industries increase more and more. Key industries (which
determine the dynamics of scientific and technological
advance) start being structurally backward in comparison
with those of highly developed market economies. The very
stability that became the symbol of belief costs more and
more.
Since the early 1960s a significant knot of socio-economic
problems has been tied around the prices of basic goods for
public consumption.
During the first stages of socialist accumulation, steady
prices under no circumstance could be a dogma. In the
1930s retail consumer prices repeatedly and sharply
increased. When the post-war currency reforms deflationary
potential was over and additional resources were needed to
be invested into agriculture, Soviet leaders decided to
increase prices temporarily. Serious disturbances in
Novochercassk, suppressed by military forces, showed a
striking example of public reaction upon price growth. The
lesson learned by Soviet leaders from those bloody events was
that prices of basic consumer goods are a pledge of political
stability, and they mustnt be touched41.
                                                            
41 Generally speaking, Alexei Nikolaevich (Kosygin, Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1964-1980  E.H.)
understood the importance of retail prices reform. Yet, when
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Meanwhile growth in agricultural production costs,
accompanied by fixed price demands, increased the budget
expenditure on investments and increased their share in
GDP.
Well-developed socialism obtains such characteristic
features:
· constant increase of the budget load, caused by contributions to
agricultural products (instead of broad resource withdrawal
from agriculture);
· steady growth of foodstuffs import, which superseded their broad
export during industrialization;
· increasing shortage of food.
The process of industrialization is a transition between the
relatively stable pre-industrialization state and just as stable,
though fundamentally different, post-industrialization state.
The march of events in Socialist countries during the 1970s
fits this hypothesis perfectly. After the potential of resource
redistribution from the traditional sector is exhausted, the
capital output ratio starts decreasing, as well as economic
growth rate. Further chances of increasing per capita gross
domestic product, as was demonstrated by the experience of
well-developed market economies, are closely connected to
decreasing the power-consumption rate, increasing the
export of processing industries and effective structural shifts
in modern industrial sectors. These circumstances are
extremely hard to reach within the framework of socialist
institutions. Falling capital output ratio whittles away striving
for accelerating economic growth at the cost of increasing
the rate of savings.
Still, even against a background of all discords, the current
economic structure was relatively stable. The economy was
self-sufficient, well provided with resources, its dependence
on import limited; foreign debts low, and the system of social
                                                                                                                  
Garbuzov (Minister of Finance at that time) happened to touch
upon that subject, his answer was clear and unambiguous: That
sort of thing is done only once in a persons life. Dont involve me
in this. It was intended that Khruschevs rise in prices, when prices
of meat were raised temporarily (for 2-3 years), turned out the
tragic events in Novochercassk. Kosygin trembled at the thought of
repeating something similar, and put off problem solving in an
unusual manner of let it be flood, if it would be after us. 
(V.Pavlov. Was the chance lost? Moscow, 1995. P. 62)
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guarantees relatively well developed (in comparison to other
countries of similar income rates).
By the late 1960s, having nearly used up the potential of
redistributing the labor force from the village to the city, the
Russian economy reached a level of development which can
be compared to the lowest verge typical for economically
developed countries  members of OECD. In 1965, per
capita GDP was $1,103 per capita in prices of 1964. At this
very rate of income, the increase in the processing industrys
export turned into a necessary prerequisite for growth. While
in the group of countries with a level of development similar
to that of the USSR, in the early 1960s (per capita GDP was
$800-1,000 in prices of 1964 and the share of agriculture in
employment was 25%) the standard volume of resource
export is approximately equal to the processing industrys
export, then in the next group (per capita GDP exceeds
$1,000 per capita) the processing industrys export is three
times as large as resource export.
Depleted possibilities for growth within the framework of the
traditional socialist model leaves two strategies for the
communist elite: either start to reorganize economic
mechanisms of regulation to renew market regulators, which
would overcome inner obstacles on the way to growth within
the socialist model, creating prerequisites for decreasing
power inputs into GDP, and increasing the quality and
borrowing power of the processing industrys production
and its share in GDP, or resign itself to loosening economic
dynamism, and laying special stress on the stability and
steadiness of current structures.
It is generally known that the question of expediently
carrying out economic reforms was the core of internal
polemics concerning the strategic problems of social and
economic development in the USSR during the mid-late
1960s42. This has to do with Eastern European satellite as
well. Those were the years when attempts were made to
supplement traditional hierarchical regulators with a system
of stimuli, to widen factories rights, to restore some
elements of market regulation within certain limits. Here
could be mentioned the reforms of 1966-1968 in the USSR,
of 1957-1958 and 1965-1969 in the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic, of 1965-1969 and 1973-1979 in the Polish People's
                                                            
42 Sutela P. Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union.
Cambridge, 1991; Mau V. In Search of Balanced Development. Moscow:
Nauka, 1990.
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Republic, of 1965-1969 in the German Democratic Republic,
and reforms in the Hungarian People's Republic that were
launched after 1957.
Analysis of their course and results permits drawing certain
conclusions43.
1. The socialist economy is an integrated system and easily
tears away or formalizes transformations that do not affect its
fundamental characteristics. Uncoordinated attempts to
introduce new indexes and extend the rights of economic
units stop affecting the work of a deep-rooted hierarchical
economys mechanisms right after the short period of top
managerial interest in innovation is over.
2. Every stable transformation includes a minimum set of
elements that considerably change the face of the economy:
(a) sharp widening of the markets role in regulating
economic activities, liberalization of a considerable share of
prices or appearance of dual prices (administrative and
market);
(b) cardinal widening of economic units independence in
what concerns forming a production program and system of
economic ties;
(c) introducing (in different forms) a stimulus dealing with
the financial results of economic activities;
(d) legalizing the private sector, at least in some sectors of
the economy.
3. Stable reforms (Yugoslavia, Hungary, China, and Vietnam)
considerably approach transformed social economies into
market economies of import-substituting industrialization.
They are united by the important role of state in regulating
the economy, bureaucratization of economic life, high rate
of tariff and non-tariff protection of the home market against
the background of a well-developed existing system of
commodity exchange and legal private sector. With the
rebirth of domestic business undertakings, its dynamic
                                                            
43 About hardships of guaranteeing reform steadiness within the
framework of the socialist system see, Kornai J. The Socialist System.
The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford, 1992; Balcerowicz L.
On the Reformability of Soviet-Type Economic Systems.  In the
Evolution of Economic Systems: Essays in Honour of Otta Sick. London,
1990. P. 193-201; Balcerowicz L. The Soviet-Type Economic System,
Reformed System and Innovativeness.  Communist Economic. 2. #1
(1990). P. 3-23.
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reaction upon economic liberalization and growth of private
savings opens the path for export-orientated market growth.
4. Integrated economic reform always puts to the test the
stability of mechanisms of social and political control in a
socialist state. It inevitably causes growth of social
differentiation and acceleration of overt inflation rate, which
undermines the basis of the socialist regimes ideology 
egalitarianism and stability. The main necessary condition
needed for successful reform lied in preserving effective
political control over the authoritarian regime, which would
be able to guarantee the capability of the hierarchic
administrations mechanisms during the period of reform
(system of directives, rationing, state control over prices), to
oppose strict budget and monetary policy to inflationary
splash, to not allow a high inflation rate and considerable
disproportion between fixed and free prices to take root.
5. All successful reforms were launched in countries where
the process of socialist industrialization was not over, and
where excess labor reserves still remained in agriculture
(China in 1978, Vietnam in the mid 1980s, SFRY in 1953,
Hungary in 1957).159
Some evident obstacles standing in the way of reforms started
at the stage of well-developed socialism:
(a) depletion of resources for socialist growth and
impossibility to use anesthesia for increasing the general
level of income in order to extenuate the problem of
growing social differentiation;
(b) impossibility to form new economic sectors at the
expense of overpopulated agrarian resources;
(c) increasing (with the systems aging) conservatism of the
political and economic elite, being in the habit of living and
working under stable conditions and unwillingness to
perceive serious social and economic innovations.
6. In cases of consistent reforms that started in comparatively
well-developed socialist economies (Hungary 1957-1968),
two circumstances predetermine the necessity of keeping a
high rate of budgetary redistribution of resources and
retarding economic growth. Firstly, there is the crisis of the
industrial structures model, formed under conditions of
socialism, and secondly, swollen during the stage of well-
developed socialist social programs. These circumstances
hamper the process of reforms extremely.
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Reforms launched in China in 1978 appeared to be the most
profound, broad and significant. They paved the way for this
countrys gradual waning of the socialist development
model. In this case, the start-up was given by the crisis of
early socialist growth followed by the absence of sufficient
resources (inner and outer) needed for forming a stable,
mature socialist society. In China during the late 1970s (as
well as in the USSR during the early 1950s) political leaders
realized the agrarian crisis as a vital economic and political
problem, a serious obstacle on the path of further economic
growth.
In the decree of CPC central committees December (1978)
plenum there is a record of the fact that per capita grain
production in 1978 is approximately equal to the level of
1957, and a conclusion is drawn about the impossibility of
raising industry without raising agriculture. Measures
primarily planned for the purpose of developing agriculture
were similar to the measures chosen by Soviet leaders in
1953: they were proclaimed necessary for increasing
agricultures share in the investment structure (up to 18%),
share of current expenses for agriculture in the budget
structure (up to 8%), increasing purchasing prices (up to
20%, for over and above plan deliveries  up to 50%),
remuneration of labor was restored communes, pressure
upon personal and subsidiary plots was diminished, etc44.
Yet at the turning-point, China still was the country with a
dominant rural population and agrarian traditions, where
part of the community was less important in comparison with
Russia. The powerful peasant movement for transition from
statute labor to tribute (transition to hearth-money, or to
farmstead tax, in terms of socialist euphemisms) envelops
the whole country.
The rigidity of stimuli speaking for this transition can be
illustrated with a paper that served as one of the points of
departure for agrarian policy  a receipt signed by 21
peasants from the Fenian district (December, 1978): We are
sharing the land among farmsteads, the chief of every
farmstead seals and signs the paper. If we are able to work,
every farmstead guarantees annual assignment concerning
delivering food tax and we will not ask the state for money
and grain. If we do not keep our word, we agree to bond our
heads. Every member of brigade guarantees maintaining our
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children under 18161. During the few years that passed before
this eloquent document was written, 60 persons died of
starvation in the brigade where its authors labored.
Of significance is that in 1979-1980, official papers aimed at
containing radical changes in the countryside. Already in a
CC of CPC document dated September 27, 1980, Some
questions of further development and responsibility for the
perfection of the system of production in agriculture we
read, that collective farming is an unshakable base of our
economys movement along the path of modernization,
having indisputable advantages in comparison with
individual farming. In this very document,
recommendations are made to restrict spreading farmstead
tax to outlying districts, remote and poor areas45. But much
tougher resource limitations in comparison with the USSR,
in combination with the powerful pressure of the peasants
initiative forced the Chinese elite to recede, de facto to
follow the way of de-collectivization. The transition towards
tribute was sanctioned ideologically only after becoming a
done fact46.
In peasant country, all the above mentioned gives incentive
for launching market mechanisms.
Simultaneously, another process that influenced further
evolution of the Chinese economy began: liberalization of
foreign trade.
After relations with the USSR were broken in 1959, China
tried to carry out a policy of relying on itself and in every
possible way limited its foreign trade; its foreign policy was
very similar to that of the USSR in the late 1930s. Since 1972
the situation has changed toward somewhat bigger openness
of foreign policy. But by 1978 it became obvious that under
the conditions of countries poor in resources, which also has
to import foodstuffs, the hope of increasing raw materials
export is unrealistic. At this stage of relatively early
development, creating the necessary prerequisites for
increasing exports from the processing industry is an evident
condition of continuing economic growth. Balance of the
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46 V.Gelbras. Economic Reforms in CPC. Moscow, 1990. P. 123;
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foreign trade deficit that appeared in 1978-1980 forces
making a decision about decreasing state investments by 40%
and slowing down industrial growth.
The reaction of the Chinese political elite toward the evident
crisis of the socialist growth model lied in the policy of
radically opening the external economic sphere: firstly,
attracting foreign investments resting upon using free zones
and redistributing excessive labor resources from agriculture
to labor industries orientated on export. China not only
renewed the effect of market mechanisms inside the country,
but also turned from self-sufficient import-substituting
industrialization to the strategy of export-orientated growth.
It is clear that in the late 1980s-early 1990s China was not a
country with a liberalized external economic trade sector in
the full sense of the word. The import of state factories was
limited and currency remained non-convertible. Yet for
privately owned enterprises, including joint ventures and
foreign factories, especially acting in free economic zones,
there existed a broad possibility for duty-free import and
freedom of export. Precisely the littoral zone, where this
policy was applied most broadly, became the main center of
export-orientated economic growth47. The result lied in
explosive export growth (10.2% annually in 1980-1990,
12.9% in 1990-1994) and increased share of production
among processing industries (from 48% in 1980 to 81% in
1993), which certainly influenced the development of other
branches and sectors of industry.
Thus, China faced inner limitations of socialist
industrialization while being at a far lower level of economic
growth than the USSR, having not exhausted the industrial
potential of traditional agriculture. Redistributing these
resources allowed it to form a new market export-orientated
sector along with an ineffective state industrial sector, owing
to which high rates of economic growth were retained.
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Last Attempt
he objective difficulties of reforming mature socialist
industrialization and also the experience of
Czechoslovakia, where such reforms paved the way to
political destabilization of the regime, prompted Soviet
leadership to abandon serious market transformation by the
end of the 60s. Still, the rich resource base, structural rigidity of the
economy and totalitarian political control seems to have guaranteed
the USSR and its Eastern European empire long-term stability with
low or zero rates of economic growth. Although the potential of
socialist industrialization is exhausted and the economy reached its
utmost level of efficiency, which is determined by the basic
characteristics of the chosen economic model, it is able to function
along that border for a long time.
Using Marxist terminology, it would mean that labor-
management relations formed during socialist
industrialization became obstacles on the way toward further
development of productive forces. Yet the ruling elite was
not interested in radical changes, and society did not have
enough strength to break the existing institutes.
By the end of the 70s, enthusiasm around the world was
fading away as well as anxiety about rapid growth of the
socialist model. Nevertheless, the notion of its stability and
firmness still prevailed in common awareness outside and
inside of the socialist countries.
Further events deranged this pattern of late socialist world.
In my another work48 I tried to show the relations between
erosion of the socialist system and real opposition as to the
interests of ruling communist elite, and I tried to analyze the
processes of privatization that started already inside the
socialist system.
In this case, I would like to place emphasis on the different
component that the predestined rapid historical collapse of a
solid and durable system seemed to be. That component is
the peculiarities of the nature of socialist growth during the
70s  80s.
In economic history, examples of means of development that
were internally unstable, reversible, and those that as their
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main support were using resources whose availability was
changeable49 are well known.
The hypothesis that I am trying to prove lies in the fact that
closely related economic development between the USSR
and member countries of the CMEA (Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance) during the 70s  80s was just as
unstable. This way of development was not able to lead the
country even to a stagnated, but stable socialist economy with
zero or low and stable rates of growth. Correspondingly, the
production collapse in post-socialist countries was caused
not only by objective difficulties of transition, but also by the
impossibility of stable support for economic structures that
were formed by growth of the 70s  80s.
Two imminent factors played an important role in late
socialist development. They were the discovery of a high-
performance oil deposit in Western Siberia and spasmodic
rise in fuel prices in the world market after 1973.
Oil money became a substitute for resources from the
traditional sector. Then new sources of development
financing arose, which substituted former turnover tax on
agrarian goods (fast increasing incomes of external
economic activity), currency for providing complete supply
of production equipment and agricultural production
purchase, energy resources that allow for building up
production and income per capita. Instead of sending
additional free resources to provide a gentle way out of
socialism, instead of market regulators return, they are used
to increase GDP per capita to the level where it could be
steadily supported inside the socialist model (graph 9)
With the beginning of the 70s, economic growth in the
USSR became more anomalous. The ratio of primary goods
in export rapidly increased but production of the processing
industry decreased. In the export ratio of machines,
equipment, and means of transport for advanced capitalist
countries, it decreases from 5.8%(1975) to 3.5% (1995)
(total export from 21.5% 1970 to 13.9% 1985, table 14)
                                                            
49 Typical example is the development of the Nigerian economy in
the 70s 80s
Economic growth in the
USSR and countries of
EMAC in 1970-1980
was an attempt to cross
the borders of inner
limitations of the
socialist growth model,
and it bore an unstable
nature. It paved the way
for a sharp crisis and
break-up of the system.
The most important
factors that caused
instability of this system
were bound up with the
basic characteristics of a
socialist economy, its low
productivity, inability to
produce competitive
export from the
processing industry,
ensuring radical decrease
in power-consumption
production.
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Table 14. External trade structure for the USSR
share in export, %
1970 1975 1980 1985
Machinery and equipment 21,5 18,7 15,8 13,9
Fuel and energy 15,6 31,4 46,9 53,7
Source: State Statistics Committee
In striking contrast to the basic tendencies of world
development is the dynamics of GDP energy consumption.
During 1970-1985, in those countries that by 1970 were at a
level of development close to that of the USSR (in Japan and
Italy where GDP per capita at that time was 1/3 greater than
that for the USSR), GDP energy consumption was one third
of the previous size. In the USSR, by using realistic
correction of the GDP deflator, its growth in 1970-1985 was
1.5  1.6 times as large50. Energy consumption during those
years increased 1.73 times.
The quasi-high part of armament expenditures in GDP
increases. By virtue of specific expenditures of the USSR,
taking into account the war and disproportionate prices, an
accurate description of such a process is rather difficult. But
available information about the size of the armament issue
and the well-known fact about attaining a military and
strategic parity with the U.S. at the very same time confirm
experts evaluation that noted growth of the military load on
the economy in the 70s (table 15).
                                                            
50 Calculations are based on the CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics.
Washington. Different years.
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Soviet leadership at the very beginning of the 70s gambled
on using big energy, financial and currency reserves to
continue competition with the West in the military field as
well as the populations standard of living. The most vivid
example of such a policy is rapid growth of provisions
import.
Table 1551 Evaluation of Military Expenditures in
GDP for the USSR
%
1970 1980
Ofer G. 13,0 16,0
Steinberg D. 13,3 13,9
Soviet leadership at the very beginning of the 70s gambled
on using big energy, financial and currency reserves to
continue competition with the West in the military field as
well as the populations standard of living. The most vivid
example of such a policy is rapid growth of provisions
import.
Under conditions of constant agrarian crisis provisions
import, including forages, one factor becomes significant,
which determines food consumption growth (table 16, for
grain import table 12)
Table 16. Agrarian Import for the USSR
in 1970-1985
1970 1975 1980
Aggregate volume of agricultural
import (billions USD. Actual prices)
2,7 10,0 19,5
Meat import (thousand tons) 165,0 515,0 821,0
Butter import (thousand tons) 2,2 11,6 249,0
Source: State Statistics Committee
                                                            
51 Ofer g. Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985. Journal of Economic
Literature. 25 (4 December) P. 1767-1833; Steinberg D. Trends in
Soviet Military Expenditure.  Soviet Studies. 1990. 42 (4). P.675-699;
Gorbachev M. gave an evaluation of aggregate military
expenditures in the USSR in the 80s as 20% of GDP.
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Meat consumption (including meat products) that was 48 kg
per capita in 1970 increased to 58 kg per capita by 1980 and
62 per capita by 1985 (in Italy by 1970 it was 59 kg).
One more remaining anomaly of growth was the attempt to
compensate the chronic agricultural inefficiency inherited
from early socialist industrialization by a wave of additional
resources. The agricultural part in aggregate volume of
investments grew from 16.7% in 1966-1970 up to 20% in
1975-1980. The general volume of investments in the
agrarian sector (comparable prices, official data) in 1981-
1985 in comparison to1966-1970 is 2.44 times as large. Big
land-improvement construction began. Irrigated areas in
1970-1985 increased by 82% and drainage areas doubled.
The supply of mineral fertilizers in 1970-1985 in terms of
100% content of useful mater was 2.5 times as large (from
10.3 to 25.4 million tons). This strong resource flow had no
influence on growth of the efficiency of the agrarian sector (table 17).
Table 17. Gross Harvesting
average per year, million tons
19711975 19811985
Grain 181,60 180,30
Cotton-wool (in terms of fiber) 2,47 2,45
Sugar-beet 71,00 76,40
Oil-bearing crops 6,69 5,71
Flax fiber (thousand tons) 456,00 377,00
Potatoes 89,80 78,40
Vegetables 23,00 29,20
Source: State Statistics Committee
Meat production growth in livestock for slaughter (12.3
million tons in 1970, 17.1 million tons in 1985) was totally
supported by grain purchasing import.
The events of 1970-1985 show us that social deformation of
the traditional sector caused by the socialist model of
industrialization is rather deep and hardly reversible.
Arbitrarily, big resource flow is not able to compensate
consequences on the stage of advanced socialism.
Under these conditions, many similar traits of economic
growth in the 60s and in 1970-1985 differ fundamentally. In
1970 (if we exclude trade with member countries of the
CMEA, which is not market trade), the USSR remains a
country with a relatively closed economy, with high material
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well being of existing economic structures typical for the
socialist model. It should be influenced by events that
happen on the world market. Nevertheless, by 1985 the role
of external economic links in the economy rapidly grew.
Financial stability (budget revenues from external trade),
preserving the consumption rates that were achieved (vast
agricultural import), functioning of the agrarian sector
(imported forages), functioning of enterprises that were
built on completely imported equipment, all depended on
current external trade52.
Meanwhile, incomes brought into the country through
foreign tradeare more and more influenced by the situation
on the fuel and energy resource markets. The inauspicious
instability of the state of the market brings about a new and
particularly complicated problem to be solved by the socialist
economy: to continue functioning under the conditions of
contracting resource provisions. It was not only a matter of
more or less stable economic stagnation, but of the threat of
an acute crisis that is followed by production and
consumption collapse. These processes turned out to be out
of the national authorities control. Further, the possibility
to support existing energy consumption also turned to be
doubtful. The difficulty of such a problem was related with
the specific character of the oil industry economy. Stability of
the whole economy of the USSR and socialist network was
currently dependent on its position in fuel and energy world
markets.
Developing new rich oil deposits allowed for initially
providing extremely low capital intensity and prime cost of
every ton of extracted oil. However, when the most accessible
deposits were exhausted and new ones were developed which
were medium to small in size, deep, and difficult to access,
resource consumption of extraction increased not by
percentages, but by times and degrees.
The economy, which was adjusted to make use of big oil
income produced at the early stages of developing rich
deposits and using it to increase military expenditures and
provision imports, now had to increase investments into the
                                                            
52 S. Glaziev correctly noticed the connection between the growing
crisis of late socialism with the overload of the export sector.
Glaziev S. About Openness and Sensible Defense of the Russian
Economy.  Reform from the Standpoint of American and Russian
Scientists. Moscow, 1996. P.238.
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fuel and energy complex in order to support the existing
level of oil extraction.
Earlier, by the end of the 60s, the economic situation in the
USSR was rather stable because even with extremely high
energy consuming GDP reserves of fuel and oil resources,
there was enough to supply it with energy for a long period
of time. The strategy of growth that was chosen was based on
an accelerated increase of oil extraction and oil export. The
strategy made the functioning of the socialist economy a
hostage of not only the availability of fuel resources, but also
of regular import of some unique deposits like Samotlor. It
was beyond any reality.
All events that happened in the USSR during 1970-1980
greatly influenced the socialist member countries of the
CMEA (table 18). As was mentioned before, member
countries of the CMEA cannot be regarded as independent
subjects of economic policy because of the home trade ratio
that was ensured by international clearing agreements.
Table 18. Reciprocal trade ratio for member
countries of the CMEA as to the general volume of
export and import
Export ratio Import ratio
Country 1970 1985 1970 1985
USSR 54 55 57 55
Bulgaria 76 76 73 77
Hungary 62 54 65 51
GDR 69 63 66 64
Cuba 74 89 63 81
Mongolia 93 99 97 97
Poland 61 67 66 72
Romania 50 47 48 55
Czechoslovakia 65 72 64 76
Source: State Statistics Committee
Rapid growth of Russias energy export created the
opportunity to increase GDP per capita in member countries
of the CMEA in two basic directions. First, reduced prices for
fuel in reciprocal trade stimulated an increase of its purchase
in the USSR for following direct re-export or for an increase
in power-consuming production export. Fuel import by
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countries of the CMEA in the 70s approximately doubled
(table 19).
Table 19. Energy import of member countries of
the CMEA in 1970-1980
Fuel and energy
import (million tons
of equivalent fuel)
Oil import
(million tons)
Country 1970 1980 1970 1980
Bulgaria 16,6 33,2  
Hungary 11,7 23,7 4,3 8,3
GDR 27,6 49,5 10,3 21,9
Cuba 8,7 15,1 4,3 6,0
Mongolia 0,4 0,9  
Poland 15,4 35,4 7,2 16,3
Romania 6,2 31,8 2,3 16,0
Czechoslovakia 22,2 44,7 9,8 19,3
Source: State Statistics Committee
Secondly, growth of oil supplies from the USSR could be
covered by the export of the globally non-competitive
machine-building industry, avoiding limitations on GDP
growth that were related to the inefficiency of the processing
industry. During 1970-1985, machines, equipment, and
means of transport imported to the USSR (in actual prices)
from CMEA countries increased from USD 2.75 billion in
1970 to USD 10.36 billion in 1980 and USD 20.1 billion in
1985. Against that very background, it becomes possible for
CSR to increase machine-building export from USD 1.9
billion in 1970 to USD 7.8 billion in 1980. The increase in
GDR machine-building export at the same time was from
USD 2.4 billion to USD 9.7 billion.
Under such conditions not only an increase but preservation
of the existing production volumes in CMEA countries
totally depended on the continuous delivery of Soviet energy
resources because it was for reduced prices.
Signs that the growth model was exhausted were based on the
oil incomes, which showed up in the early 80s. In spite of
continuous rapid FEC (fuel and energy complex) investment
growth (in 1986 they doubled from the level in 1975) and
part of FEC in aggregate volume of investment, oil extraction
growth stopped. In 1980 603 million tons were extracted, in
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1985, 595 million tons. Oil export became stable: 119 million
tons in 1980, 117 million tons in 1985. During 1970-1980 the
real volume of export increased by 62% and cost volume, as a
result of favorable export price dynamics, increased 3.7
times. During 1980-1985 the real volume of export increased
only by 7.4% and its cost volume reached a maximum in
1983 (USD 91.4 billion) began to decrease (in 1985 it was
USD 86.7 billion).
As a matter of fact, from that time on the mechanism of disastrous
decay of the socialist system and, therefore drastic decrease in
production and standard of living was launched. Feverish attempts
to restrain a decrease in oil extraction in 1986-1987 led to over-
forcing deposits and accelerated decrease in further extraction. The
economy fell into a vicious cycle that consisted of means for
investment support of oil extraction shortage, impossibility of their fast
redistribution under conditions of the inert socialist economic
structure, decrease in oil extraction, intensified power-consuming
national economic crisis, further reduction of oil industry investments
and accelerated decrease in production. Oil extraction in the
RSFSR decreased from 542 million tons in 1985 to 462
million tons in 1991 and stabilized at the level of 307 million
tons in 1995 (in the RSFSR, 304 million tons was the level of
1971).
At the very beginning of the 80s, the USSR lost all bygone
freedom of financial maneuvers. Active formation of
commodity credits for financing different numerous
building sites led to the problematic situation. In 1981,
revenue from credits given to other countries (USD 2
billion) covered less than 30% of credit given to the USSR
(USD 6.4 billion). Restitution of old credits was provided at
the expense of newly received ones. Their structure
deteriorated with time. The ratio of medium-term and short-
term debts increased. A constant increase in expenditures to
cover the debts became a vivid reflection of the situation. In
1984 its balance was USD 5.9 billion, in 1986 it was USD 15.1
billion. By the beginning of Perestroika, the increase in
foreign debt looked like an avalanche. In 1985, when
Gorbachev came to head the country, only on the surface did
the economic situation seem to be depressingly firm. In
practice, the possibility of not only developing but
preserving the existing level of production and consumption
totally depended on factors that were out of control. They
were the state of the worlds oil and gas markets, discovery of
new deposits with extremely high efficiency, opportunity of
obtaining free long-term credit on the worlds financial
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markets with low interest rates. However landslide of oil
prices on the world market, reduction of the absolute level of
export entering the country (USD 91.4 billion in 1983 and
USD 86.7 billion in 1985) showed that a miracle was not
going to happen.
The history of Perestroikas economic policy: basic economic
mistakes by Gorbachevs team, connection between the
increasing budget crisis and anti-alcohol campaign and an
attempt to force economic growth, loosing control over the
monetary base, increasing suppressed inflation, economy of
populism and the expansion of social outlays in 1989-1991,
exchange crisis, attempts to patch up gaps in an economy
that is tearing at the seams by withdrawing gold reserves,
using foreign currency reserves, confiscating businesses
currency accounts, state bankruptcy and failure of
hierarchical economic mechanisms  all this is reflected in
economic literature and is not a topic of this paper53.
It should be mentioned that objective appraisal of the stated
facts and the very character of economic growth in the 1970s
- early 1980s forces us to admit the fact that the role of
Gorbachevs and Rijcovs economic mistakes in the failure of
socialism was not as significant as it is considered to be.
Indeed, in many respects what they did was contra-effective
and fallacious in the current situation. Yet those mistakes
determined only the terms and particular mechanisms of the
crisis, but not its origin and dimensions. The crisis itself was
unavoidable.
Attempts to cross the borders of the economic growth rate
achievable under the conditions of the socialist model led to
one more result. By the late 1960s, two countries of socialist
camps (German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic) had their per capita GDP standard
exceed the verge, dividing the group of well-developed
democratic countries. Not accidentally, in these very
countries in 1989 the events revealing the failure of
communist regimes started. However, till the end of the
1980s, these countries were vassal, dependent, formed part
                                                            
53 See, e.g.: Gaidar E. Inflationary Pressure and Economic Reform
in the Soviet Union.  Economic Transition in Eastern Europe. Oxford,
1993; Gaidar E. Russian Reform. Cambridge, 1995; Lacis O. What
Happened to Us and What Will Happen. Moscow, 1995; Sinelnicov S.
Budget Crisis in Russia: 1985-1995. Moscow, 1995; Aslund A. How
Russia Became Market Economy.
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of the Soviet Empire and were unable to become democratic
on their own.
In this connection, events taking place in the USSR were really
signified: being inwardly unbalanced and unstable, based on
economic growth from oil revenue by the beginning of the 1980s,
tightly approximated the countrys per capita GDP standard toward
the standard of the group of well-developed democracies. Urbanization,
development of education, increased information concerning the outer
world, gradual increase in the strata of society with middle class
consumption structure, - everything slackened the totalitarian regime.
After the first timid liberalization steps were undertaken by M.
Gorbachev during early Perestroika (1985-1987), these very factors
determined the appearance of a mighty democratic wave, the control
over which was soon lost. The economic crisis generated by
decreasing oil revenue and failure of the economic growth
strategy followed during the past two decades gave this wave
additional strength. Deprived of power support from
Moscow, communist regimes of Eastern Europe started
collapsing.
Common blame placed on Gorbachev is for starting with
political liberalization instead of economic reform (as
Chinese leaders did). From the relationship between the
economy and politics, it is reasonable to ask whether he had
other real opportunities. Indeed, Soviet leaders of the early
1970s, especially L. Brezhnev, who bet on inwardly unstable,
economic growth based on oil revenue, chose the strategy
that made the disastrous failure of socialist political institutes
inevitable.
Since the above-formed hypothesis about the extreme inner
instability and artificiality of economic growth in the USSR
and countries of Economical Mutual Aid Council starting
with the 1970s, it is natural to assume that after this
strategys failure the volume and structure of production and
consumption should become stabilized on the level similar
to that of the 1970s. Distinctions from this trend should first
appear in these structures of a socialist economy, whose
parameters for some reason are similar to those in
economies (not passed through socialist experiment) with an
analogous level of development.
In 1995 against the background of stabilization of market
institutes, financial and monetary systems in Russia, the
volume of oil mining amounted to 307 million tons (304 in
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1971)54. Grain import amounted to 2.1 million tons in 1994,
0.6 million tons in 1995 (the USSR in 1970- 2.2 million tons).
Strict decrease of grain export caused a fall in meat
production to 5.9 million tons (RSFSR in 1970- 6.2 million
tons). Low productivity of Russian animal husbandry made
grain export especially ineffective. Against the background of
market prices, increase in the share of cattle-breeding
production in the structure of agricultural products, import
was inevitable. Russian import of agricultural products in
1995 exceeded the level of the USSR in the 1980s (1995  1.2
million tons, 1980  0.82 million tons). Due to this, a fall of
meat and meat products was less serious than a fall of
production.
Considerable changes in the structure of the fuel balance,
sharp fall of coals share in it, increasing gas share during
1970-1980 agreed with the logic of comparative preferences
and remained in post-socialist conditions.
In 1995 the production of cast iron in Russia amounted to
39.8 million tons (RSFSR in 1970  41.9 million tons), of
rolled metal  39.0 million tons (RSFSR in 1970  43.1
million tons). In metallurgy (after being restrained for twenty
years) the process of bringing out open-hearth furnaces,
increasing the share of oxygen-converter steel in the
structure of output started, which is typical for well-
developed market economies.
Any cost indexes of industrial production in a long period of
time inevitably are extremely unreliable under Soviet or post-
Soviet conditions because of unreliability calculations that
bring prices to a comparable level. Nevertheless, if in the
absence of better encompassing indexes we use CPIs
deflators, we will see that the volume of industrial
production in 1995 (50% of 1990) is roughly equal to the
level of early the 1970s. Thus, as applied to Russia the
hypothesis about production and consumption stabilization
after the failure of socialism on the level of steady socialist
maximum, preceding the stage of oil growth in 1970-1980,
proves to be principally true.
                                                            
54 There are no reliable statistics of foreign trade for RSFSR for the
period preceding 1991. That is why we can use data for RSFSR
while dealing with production indexes, but for indexes concerning
foreign trade we must use the USSRs data as a whole. This is
admissible because RSFSR production dominated Soviet export,
and it obtained the most part of imported resources.
Failure of the socialist
model caused a drastic
fall in production and
consumption in former
socialist countries to a
level similar to that of the
early 1970s.
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The failure of this strategy inevitably caused a breakdown of
mutual clearing trade mechanisms within the borders of the
Economic Mutual Aid Council, sharp decrease in the share
of mutual trade in the structure of import and export of
corresponding countries, limitation of energy import, and,
correspondingly, of re-export for countries of Eastern
Europe, stimulated structural reorganization aiming at
decreasing power-consuming of their economies55.
If the above stated hypothesis about the unstable nature of
economic growth in 1970 - 1980 is correct, then it would be
reasonable to assume that the measure of per capita
industrial production fall after socialisms collapse is roughly
equal to the improvement reached during this period. Thus,
the dimension of fall should be the largest where economic
growth was the most dynamic, and the smallest in economies
whose growth rate was moderate56.
In Eastern Europe the fall in industrial production appeared
to be the largest in countries whose growth rate in 1975-1989
was the highest (Bulgaria and Rumania), and the smallest in
less dynamic during those years (Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Hungary). In the trough of after-crisis fall all these countries
reached the standards of industrial production similar to
those of 1975.
Now let us see what parameters of socialist economy of the
1980s most seriously differed from those of economies with
an analogous level of development.
Among the most serious differences should be mentioned an
essentially higher share of tax taking in GDP, lesser share of
non-material, lesser share of export in GDP, lesser indexes of
income differentiation, higher power-consumption of GDP.
Thus, a well-developed socialist economy differs from a
market with larger closeness, orientation toward production,
energy inefficiency and egalitarianism. The chosen growth
model influences the structure of consumption. So, while the
consumption of foodstuffs was roughly equal to the standard
                                                            
55 About the impossibility to preserve most structures in the Eastern
Europe economy without specific trade conditions that existed in
EMAC see: Balcerowicz L. Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation.
Budapest, 1995.
56 This peculiar rule was first noticed by J.Kornai in his paper
Transformational Recession.  Kornai J. Transformational
Recession. A General Phenomenon Examined Through the
Example of Hungarys Development.  Economic Applique,
XLVI.1993(2). P. 181-227.
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for countries with an analogues level of development, the
indexes of motorization and installation of telephones were
appreciably lower.
The share of tax revenue in GDP (including beyond-budget
funds) decreased from 48.9% in 1980 to 31ed the1% in 1995
(Russia), but it still exceeds indexes typical for market
economies of a corresponding development level (18-28%).57
The share of nonmaterial increased from 37% in 1980 to
51% in 1996 and reached the standard typical for the upper
group of average-income economies in 1994 (53%). It is hard
to compare the ratio of export to GDP in the USSR and
Russia because of trade specificity within the EMAC, and
now within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Nevertheless, every estimation analysis shows an essential
increase in the economys openness. Indexes of income
differentiation increased (Jeanys coefficient in 1992  0.289,
in 1995  0.381). The ratio of high-income quintile and low-
income quintile exceeds the standard typical of highly
developed market economies, yet it still stays lower than the
typical level of economies with per capita GDP similar to
Russias.
Distinctive are changes in the structure of consumption. The
consumption of meat and meat products appreciably
decreased in comparison with the maximum (late 1980s) and
reached the level of the 1970s (table 20).
Table 20. Consumption of meat and meat
products in Russia
kg*
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Per capita consumption 46 57 59 62 69 53
* In conversion into meat, without by-product of II category and raw fat
Source: State Statistics Committee
Meanwhile, indexes of motorization and installation of
telephones (which provided the most significant lag between
the USSRs index and world trend in 1970) continued to
grow (table 21).
                                                            
57 Calculations of the normative value of tax taking share in GDP
conformably to specified per capita GDP have been realized by
S.Sinelnikov and I.Trunin. the lowest border of an interval is when
GDP is computed using current rate of exchange, the highest is
when considering purchasing-power parity.
Restoration of market
regulators caused
tendencies to
approaching post-
socialist economies
structural characteristics
to indexes peculiar to
market economies of the
same development level.
Though even nowadays,
as will be shown in
chapter 6, post-socialist
economies differ in the
great volume of resource
redistribution through
the state budget. High
power-consumption of
production and less share
of the processing
industrys export in GDP
are peculiar to them, - it
will take years and years
and violent efforts to
change the situation.
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Table 21. The dynamics of motorization and
installation of telephones in Russia
1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of cars (per 1000 persons) 30,0 44,0 59,0 95,0
Number of telephone sets in a
public network (million)
13,5 17,6 23,4 26,8
Source: State Statistics Committee
Neither Russian nor Soviet statistics have reliable data
concerning the dynamics of families provisions with
videotape recorders and computers. But its rapid growth
during 1990-1995 is evident.
Thus, while Russias basic level of production and
consumption turns out to be similar to the USSRs level
before its oil spurt started, the most important indexes of
Russias economic structure gradually approximate the
normal standard of market economies with equal per capita
GDP.
It is clear that you cannot enter one river twice: some trends
in structural transformation are almost irreversible. For
instance, though in the early 1990s against the background
of production fall, the process of increasing the share of
employed in agriculture and forestry was in progress (1990 
13.6%, 1995  14.9%), those indexes could not be brought to
the level of the early 1970s (RSFSR  18.9%).
Society always perceives adaptation to decrease in existing
consumption levels extremely painfully, especially if it is
followed with the failure of social institutes and settled
norms of behavior, with drastic changes in reward
distribution. The symptoms of this painful reaction are an
increase in crime and mortality, decrease in average life span
(table 22-23).
Table 22. Dynamics of the post-socialist crisis
in Russia
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mortality index
(per 1000 persons)
11,2 12,2 14,4 15,7 14,9 
Number of registered
murders (thousands)
21,1 23,0 29,2 32,3 31,7 29,4
Number of registered
suicides (thousands)
39,2 31,0 38,0 42,0 41,0 
Source: State Statistics Committee
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Only in 1995 did adaptation to changes start, and provided
the beginning of volte-face in the dynamics of these indexes.
Table 23. Indexes of nations health in Russia
and other countries with comparable level of per
capita GDP58
Expected duration of life
at birth (years)
Infant mortality
(per 1000 births)
Russia 65 17,5
Thailand 69 36
Poland 72 15
Venezuela 71 32
Brazil 67 56
Czech Rep 73 8
Malaysia 71 12
Chile 72 12
Hungary 70 12
Mexico 71 35
Argentina 72 23
During the past few years, indexes of infant mortality didnt
change appreciably (1990  17.4). This parameter, which, in
fact, characterizes the level of development of national
public health service, in Russia approximates the standard
particular to countries with a corresponding level of
development.
It is clear that the exhaustion of most efficacious energy
resources deposits is nearly irreversible, and some results of
late socialist growth have grave consequences, i.e. rapid
growth of the ratio of external debt/GDP.
After having come a dramatic way of development in the XX century,
having experimented with the socialist model and outlived its crash,
Russia, on the verge of the XXI century, finds itself at approximately
the same distance from the U.S. as it was in the centurys beginning:
in 1913 Russian per capita GDP, according to Meddisons
calculations, amounted to $1,488, American - $5,307 (in USD of
                                                            
58 Infant mortality in Russia  State Statistics Committee, 1996,
January-July. Life span  1995, other countries  data by World
Bank, 1994.
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1990). In 1990, corresponding indexes amounted to $6,871 in the
USSR, $21,866 in the U.S.59
Several conclusions:
1. Removing market mechanisms and substituting them with an
integrated hierarchy allows for extending possibilities of maneuvering
the savings rate rapidly, increasing the dimensions of resource
redistribution from traditional agriculture, and obtaining a high
growth rate of the share in industry and industrial production
volume.
2. The crisis of this growth model starts after basic resources of
traditional agriculture are drained. This is when all of its inner
limitations become apparent  high power-consumption, low
borrowing power of the process industrys production, absence of
structural shift mechanisms within the framework of the economys
modern sector, low effectiveness of investments. The totality of these
factors makes for a trend towards a rapid fall in the capital
productivity ratio and in the economic growth rate.
3. Greater rigidity of resource limitations incites countries with poor
resources to leave the framework of the socialist growth model during
the early stages of development, when they still possess sizeable reserves
of cheap man power with zero ultimate output in the traditional
sector. Countries rich in resources have the opportunity to respond to
the crisis of early socialist industrialization with increasing mineral
export and agricultural import.
4. Leaving socialism with preserving economic growth is possible only
at early stages of industrialization, when the potential of the
traditional peasant sector is retained, on whose base market economy
(parallel to that of the state) will grow (as it was in China). After
basic reserves of the traditional sector are exhausted, any strategy
aiming toward renewing market growth demands serious structural
reorganization of the modern industrial sector and is inevitably
followed by a fall in production volume.
5. Economic growth in the USSR and countries of EMAC in 1970-
1980 was an attempt to cross the borders of inner limitations of the
socialist growth model, and it bore an unstable nature. It paved the
way for a sharp crisis and break-up of the system. The most important
factors that caused instability of this system were bound up with the
basic characteristics of a socialist economy, its low productivity,
inability to produce competitive export from the processing industry,
ensuring radical decrease in power-consumption production.
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6. Failure of the socialist model caused a drastic fall in production
and consumption in former socialist countries to a level similar to
that of the early 1970s.
7. Restoration of market regulators caused tendencies to approaching
post-socialist economies structural characteristics to indexes peculiar
to market economies of the same development level. Though even
nowadays, as will be shown in chapter 6, post-socialist economies
differ in the great volume of resource redistribution through the state
budget. High power-consumption of production and less share of the
processing industrys export in GDP are peculiar to them, - it will take
years and years and violent efforts to change the situation.
The conducted analysis allows us to understand the reasons of failure
in attempts to keep production structures during oil growth in 1970-
1980. These structures themselves were inwardly unstable and
unbalanced; they couldnt exist without outer resource replenishment.
Not preserving existing links and production structures, but rapidly
reorganizing them to adapt to fundamentally different conditions of
the post-socialist world is the most important prerequisite for
stabilizing and renewing economic growth.
